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Preface 
 
 
The Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) at the Norwegian School of 
Management BI has for the third time invited a committee of economists for 
Norges Bank Watch, with the objective to evaluate the monetary-policy re-
gime in Norway and Norges Bank’s conduct of monetary policy.  The new 
committee for Norges Bank Watch 2002 consists of Professor Lars E.O. 
Svensson (chair), Princeton University, Chief Economist Kjetil Houg, Alfred 
Berg, Doctorate Student Haakon O.Aa. Solheim, Norwegian School of Man-
agement BI, and Professor Erling Steigum, Norwegian School of Manage-
ment BI.  
 
The aim of Norges Bank Watch is to contribute to the general discussion on 
monetary policy and institutions among the political system, the academic 
community and other interested parties.  Two years ago, Norges Bank Watch 
2000 suggested that the Bank’s actual interpretation of its stable exchange-
rate mandate should be formalized as a flexible inflation-targeting regime.  
In March 2001, the government introduced a formal inflation target regime.  
As was the case in last year’s report, we do not have the ambitions to suggest 
another major change of the system, but we hope to highlight important as-
pects of the present regime and we recommend a number of possible im-
provements of the regime. 
 
The committee is solely responsible for the report and the views presented 
there, and the report does not necessarily represent the views of the CME or 
its members. 
 
Oslo, September 19, 2002 
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Executive summary 
 
 
The Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) at the Norwegian School of 
Management BI has for the third time invited a committee of economists for 
Norges Bank Watch, with the objective to evaluate the monetary-policy re-
gime in Norway and Norges Bank’s conduct of monetary policy.  The com-
mittee for Norges Bank Watch 2002 consists of Professor Lars E.O. Svens-
son (chair), Princeton University, Chief Economist Kjetil Houg, Alfred Berg, 
Doctorate Student Haakon O.Aa. Solheim, Norwegian School of Manage-
ment BI, and Professor Erling Steigum, Norwegian School of Management 
BI.  The committee met in Oslo in June 2002, had discussions with key offi-
cials at Norges Bank and the Ministry of Finance, and has worked on its re-
port until September 2002.  
 
A realistic view of monetary policy 
In order to evaluate the conduct of monetary policy, it is important to have a 
realistic view of what monetary policy can and cannot achieve.  People typi-
cally ask too much of monetary policy—no less in Norway than elsewhere.  
In the long term, monetary policy can only control nominal variables such as 
inflation and the nominal exchange rate.  It is beyond the capacity of any 
central bank to increase the average level or the growth rate of real variables 
such as GDP and employment, or to affect the average level of the real ex-
change rate.  At best, monetary policy can reduce the variability of real vari-
ables somewhat.  An attempt to increase the average level or growth rate of 
GDP, or to maintain a real undervaluation of the currency, would trigger 
every-rising inflation, at increasing cost to the economy in terms of less effi-
cient resource allocation and arbitrary and inequitable redistributions of in-
come and wealth.  For these reasons, an increasing number of countries have 
specified low and stable inflation, “price stability,” as the primary goal for 
monetary policy.  
 
In the short and medium term, monetary policy has effects on both nominal 
and real variables.  However, the complex transmission mechanism of mone-
tary policy, varying lags and strength of the effects through different chan-
nels, unpredictable shocks and inherent uncertainty combine to prevent fine-
tuning.   
 
Best-practice inflation targeting  
There is considerable agreement among policy makers, academics and re-
searchers in the monetary-policy area that so-called flexible inflation target-
ing is the best monetary-policy setup.  Then inflation is stabilized around a 
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low inflation target in the medium term rather than at the shortest possible 
horizon, and a gradual and measured policy response avoids creating unnec-
essary variability in the real economy.  Any required real exchange-rate ad-
justments are achieved through a floating exchange rate.  Because of shocks, 
uncertainty and imperfect control, considerable variability may remain in the 
real economy, especially for small, open and less diversified economies like 
Norway.  Best-practice central banks that have adopted flexible inflation 
targeting include the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England 
and Sveriges Riksbank.  We believe these banks provide a relevant standard 
of comparison for the conduct of monetary policy in Norway. 
 
Fiscal policy and real appreciation  
Of special importance to Norway is the fact that a permanent future fiscal 
expansion, which is implied by the new guidelines for fiscal policy and the 
phase-in of the oil revenues, is likely to lead to a permanent real appreciation 
of the krone, a current increase in the neutral real interest rate and an even 
larger real appreciation of the currency in the short and medium term.  This 
real appreciation is an equilibrium response of the economy to the new fis-
cal-policy situation and the related increased relative demand for output and 
resources of the sector producing nontradable goods and services (the sector 
sheltered from international competition).  It will imply reduced competi-
tiveness of the tradable-goods sector in Norway (the export and import-
competing sectors exposed to international competition) and will most likely 
lead to reduced output, employment and profits in the tradable-goods sector.  
Attempts to delay such an equilibrium adjustment of the real exchange rate 
by stabilizing the nominal exchange is likely to be quite costly and result in 
more variable inflation and output gap, without in the end preventing the real 
appreciation of the currency.  
 
The institutional framework  
With regard to the institutional framework for monetary policy, there is con-
siderable agreement among central bankers, academics and researchers in 
the areas of political economy and monetary policy that the institutional 
framework that is best designed to achieve the short- and long-term goals for 
monetary policy in a democratic society is one with (1) a legislated mandate 
of price stability, (2) operational independence for the central bank in fulfill-
ing the mandate, and (3) accountability structures that make the central bank 
accountable to the government or the parliament for fulfilling the mandate.  
During the 1990s, central-bank legislation in many countries has been re-
formed to meet these requirements.   
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With regard to the institutional framework for monetary policy in Norway, 
we find that it has considerable weaknesses.  There is no legislated mandate 
for price stability.  Although Norges Bank in practice has considerable op-
erational independence, this independence is insufficiently safeguarded in 
the central-bank act.  There is no explicit accountability structure according 
to which Norges Bank can be held accountable for its policy.  In a well-
known international comparison of central-bank legislation, Norges Bank is 
ranked as the least independent central bank among the developed econo-
mies.  With regard to the institutional framework, we have the following 
recommendation: 
 
• A full-fledged institutional reform should be undertaken, similar to those 
that have been accomplished in the U.K. or Sweden.  The reform should 
specify a mandate for price stability, operational independence, and ac-
countability for Norges Bank.  
 
Within the existing legislative framework, however, there are several poten-
tial improvements that we recommend: 
   
• In order to resolve the inherent inconsistency between exchange-rate 
stability and low and stable inflation for Norway, the references to ex-
change-rate stability in the monetary-policy guidelines should be de-
leted.  (More precisely, the first sentence should be deleted and the sec-
ond sentence moved to after the fifth sentence.) 
• The appointments to the Executive Board should be of experts on mone-
tary policy and related areas, for instance, macroeconomics and financial 
markets, so that the members can independently contribute to the 
achievement of the announced objectives for monetary policy.  
• The custom to invite political parties to nominate members to the Execu-
tive Board should be discontinued, in order to avoid the risk of sectoral, 
political or special-interest representation and related risks of deadlocks 
or policy directed to special interests rather than the country as a whole. 
• Nonattributed minutes and attributed voting records from the Executive 
Board should be published, in order to strengthen the accountability and 
further improve transparency.  These minutes should note without attri-
bution to individual members which issues were discussed and what ar-
guments were presented, as well as how individual members have voted.  
• The essential material on monetary policy submitted to or formulated by 
the Executive Board, for instance, the Strateginotat (Notes on Strategy) 
outlining policy for the next four months, should be published, in order 
to strengthen accountability and further improve transparency.  
• Several additional improvements to strengthen the accountability of 
Norges Bank should be undertaken:  (1) An evaluation by the Ministry 
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of Finance of how Norges Bank has conducted monetary policy and 
achieved the stated objectives for monetary policy should be included in 
the Kredittmelding (the report by the Ministry of Finance to the Stort-
ing).  (2) Regular hearings on monetary policy should be held in the 
Storting with the governor and other officials of Norges Bank, with the 
assistance of experts appointed by the Storting.  (3) An annual or bian-
nual conference on monetary policy in Norway should be held, financed 
by Norges Bank but organized independently, for instance, by an aca-
demic institution, and open to the general public and media.  At such a 
conference, papers evaluating monetary policy by the Bank could be 
presented by national and international experts followed by comments 
by Bank officials and public discussion. 
 
The conduct of monetary policy  
When it comes to the conduct of monetary policy, we believe Norwegian 
monetary policy is in very good hands.  The Bank has a very competent and 
highly trained top management and staff.  The top management and many in 
the staff has long experience of economic policy, both monetary and fiscal 
policy.  The Bank has a long tradition of academic research and analysis.  
Although the Bank has a short experience of inflation targeting, for several 
years before inflation targeting was introduced, it organized conferences and 
meetings on monetary policy, including inflation targeting, with academic 
researchers and central-bank officials from many countries.  In this way the 
Bank built up an understanding of, and a competence in inflation targeting.  
We believe the Bank’s Inflation Reports, the speeches by Bank officials and 
published articles and working papers by the Bank clearly demonstrate the 
high quality of the Bank’s analysis and understanding.  The Bank gives the 
impression of being a very competent and enthusiastic newcomer to the in-
flation-targeting camp, and it is our firm view that it masters the insights re-
quired for successful inflation targeting.   
 
Overall, we believe Norges Bank is conducting monetary policy in line with 
the best international practice, like that demonstrated by the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand, the Bank of England and the Riksbank.  Nevertheless, we 
would like to recommend a number of improvements to the conduct of 
monetary policy, which if undertaken would in several cases push the fron-
tier of best-international-practice inflation targeting further out: 
 
• Inflation projections should generally be done conditional on the Bank’s 
preferred instrument-rate path; that is, conditional on its best forecast of 
its future interest-rate settings.  This would normally be a time-varying 
instrument-rate path.  The assumed exchange-rate path should also nor-
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mally be the Bank’s best forecast of the future exchange rate, also nor-
mally a time-variable path.  This would avoid some problems and incon-
sistencies associated with the current standard assumption of constant in-
terest and exchange rates.  It may also make monetary policy more pre-
dictable and improve the Bank’s communication with the market.  
• The central projections should be the mean projections (the probability-
weighted average outcome) rather than mode projections (the most 
likely outcome).  This is in line with established economic theory, which 
says that it is the mean forecast rather than the mode forecast that is 
relevant for decisions.  This would normally make the somewhat cum-
bersome adjustment of the mode projection to the balance of risk unnec-
essary, and the fan charts for the projections would mainly be used to il-
lustrate the uncertainty of the projections. 
• The Bank should construct and publish projections of potential output, 
actual output and hence the output gap, conditional on time-variable in-
strument-rate paths.  In this way the Bank can better reach the most de-
sirable compromise between inflation variability and output-gap vari-
ability and the resulting compromise will be more open to external scru-
tiny. 
• The emphasis on the precise two-year horizon of inflation projections on 
target should be reduced.  Instead, the Bank should find the projections 
of inflation, the output gap and the corresponding instrument-rate path 
that the Bank thinks would achieve the best compromise between infla-
tion stability and output-gap stability.  These projections should be pub-
lished in the Inflation Report and the Bank should set its instrument rate 
accordingly.  These projections will then be the Bank’s best uncondi-
tional forecast of future inflation, output gap and instrument rate. Pub-
lishing them will maximize the impact on private-sector expectations 
and thereby implement monetary policy more effectively.  Publishing 
them also opens the Bank’s projections for more precise external scru-
tiny.  The fan charts around the projections should be constructed and in-
terpreted as the Bank’s best unconditional estimate of the uncertainty in 
the projections, thus conditional on its own future policy response. 
• The Bank’s analysis and explanations might benefit from further use of 
the concepts of potential output, output gap and neutral real interest rate. 
• The Bank could be more explicit about the weight it puts on output-gap 
stability relative to inflation stability.  
 
The debate on monetary policy and currency appreciation  
The krone has appreciated strongly in both nominal and real terms.  We find 
the real appreciation of the krone a logical outcome of the new guidelines for 
fiscal policy, which imply a permanent future fiscal expansion.  This is 
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likely to be accompanied by not only a permanent real appreciation of the 
krone but an even stronger current real appreciation and a higher neutral real 
interest rate.   These adjustments are equilibrium adjustments of the real 
economy to the new fiscal policy.  Thus, they occur independently of mone-
tary policy, and cannot be prevented by monetary policy.  Monetary policy 
might delay the real appreciation somewhat by focusing on stabilizing the 
nominal exchange rate instead of inflation and the output gap.  Perhaps such 
monetary policy could delay the real appreciation a few quarters or perhaps a 
year or so.  Such a monetary policy, by being in the short run more expan-
sionary than current policy by Norges Bank, would in the present situation 
most likely lead to increasing inflation and an overheated economy.  The real 
appreciation induced by fiscal policy would then arise through an increase in 
the price level.  As discussed in the text of the report, historically such poli-
cies, because of the inherent inertia in inflation once it has taken off, have 
lead to an over-appreciation and hence overvaluation of the currency, and 
the boom has quickly turned to bust.   
 
As far as we can see, in the current situation with a zero or positive output 
gap and considerable inflationary pressure, Norges Bank is conducting infla-
tion targeting according to best international practice.  This requires a rela-
tively high real interest rate, but this is not surprising since the neutral real 
interest rate is likely to be higher, because of the future fiscal expansion and 
related current growth in consumption and aggregate demand.      
 
The current public debate about the real appreciation and monetary policy 
seems quite confused.  Several recent debaters do not seem to understand the 
relation between the real appreciation and fiscal policy and the limitations of 
monetary policy.  Arguably, the Bank’s motivation for the de facto inflation 
target from 1999 may have contributed to the confusion.  There, inflation 
equal to that in Europe was motivated as a way to achieve long-run stability 
in the exchange rate.  This argument relies on long-term purchasing-power 
parity, that is, the long-term real exchange rate is stable.  However, in an oil 
economy where oil revenues sooner or later will be phased in, long-term 
purchasing power is unlikely to apply.  Indeed, as argued above, a permanent 
fiscal expansion may trigger a permanent real appreciation of the currency.  
Although this is well known by the Bank, arguably the Bank could explain 
the current situation with even more clarity.  Thus, we recommend:  
 
• The Bank should more clearly explain the limits of monetary policy in 
relation to the real adjustment of the Norwegian economy that is likely 
to take place due to the new guidelines of fiscal policy and, in particular, 
explain that monetary policy cannot be expected to prevent the associ-
ated real appreciation of the krone.   
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Research at the Bank  
Norges Bank has a strong research tradition.  Its Research Department plays 
a leading role in Norwegian macroeconomic research.  The department is 
also very strong in time-series econometrics and the economics of banking.   
 
The Bank is somewhat unusual among inflation-targeting central banks in 
that the main economic model used for projections and simulations, RIMINI, 
is largely an empirical so-called reduced-form model that generalizes the 
empirical properties of Norwegian data.  Most other inflation-targeting cen-
tral banks instead to a large extent use structural models that are closer to 
macroeconomic theory and have equations that have structural interpreta-
tions.  An inflation-targeting central bank needs to make projections condi-
tional on alternative instrument-rate settings, for instance, instrument-rate 
paths.  Doing this in a reduced-form model is associated with inherent prob-
lems, especially whether the reduced-form model is invariant to the alterna-
tive instrument-rate paths.  A mostly empirical model is also very sensitive 
to the problem of being estimated on data from a different monetary-policy 
regime, in the Norwegian case from periods of exchange-rate targeting and 
interest-rate regulation. 
 
Although the Bank and individual researchers there have already produced 
impressive research on the theory and practice of inflation targeting, we be-
lieve even more resources should be shifted to such activities.  Active re-
search in these areas is of considerable importance to the Bank.  The Bank 
must have its own competence and capacity for such research for several 
reasons:  Such competence and capacity is necessary in order to rightly as-
sess the quality and practicality of research related to monetary policy and 
inflation targeting conducted at other central banks and academic institu-
tions, which is a prerequisite for taking advantage of and applying such re-
search to Norwegian problems and issues of concern for Norges Bank.  Fur-
thermore, such competence and capacity is necessary to do research specifi-
cally directed to specific Norwegian problems and issues of concern for 
Norges Bank.  Finally, such competence and capacity at the Bank will allow 
the Bank to contribute to the world-wide development of monetary policy 
and inflation targeting.  Regarding the research at Norges Bank, we recom-
mend: 
 
• Less emphasis on the Bank’s large reduced-form model RIMINI and 
more emphasis on the development of alternative structural models. 
• An even stronger commitment to research at an academic level on issues 
related to monetary policy in general and inflation targeting in particular.  
• A high proportion of the working papers should be of such quality that 
they are accepted for publication in international scientific journals. 
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1  Introduction 
 
 
This report on monetary policy and institutions in Norway, Norges Bank 
Watch 2002, is an evaluation of the institutional framework for monetary 
policy, the new monetary policy regime of March 2001, and the conduct of 
monetary policy by Norges Bank under the new regime.  The report also in-
cludes a number of recommendations for improvement of the institutional 
framework, the new guidelines and the conduct of monetary policy.  
 
The committee for Norges Bank Watch 2002 met in Oslo in two periods, 
during June 10-12 and September 17-19.  During the first period, we col-
lected information, had a meeting with officials of the Ministry of Finance, 
had several meetings with the management and staff of Norges Bank, and 
had a meeting with Hermod Skånland, former Governor of Norges Bank.  
We also had preliminary discussions within the committee and outlined the 
main topics of our report.  The report was largely completed in the period 
between the two periods and finalized during our second meeting in Oslo. 
 
The report is organized in the following way.  Section 2 discusses the princi-
ples of inflation targeting, a realistic view of what monetary policy can and 
cannot achieve, the appropriate goals for monetary policy, and, importantly, 
the real-exchange rate effects of fiscal policy.  Section 3 discusses optimal 
delegation of monetary policy, the institutional framework for monetary pol-
icy in Norway, and the monetary-policy guidelines of March 2001.  The sec-
tion ends with a few recommendations for improvements of the institutional 
framework and the monetary-policy guidelines.  Section 4 discusses the im-
pact of fiscal policy and the phase-in of the oil revenues, the new economic-
policy framework of March 2001, and the lessons for the Norwegian econ-
omy and the challenges for monetary policy.  Section 5 discusses how Nor-
ges Bank conducts monetary policy, how inflation targeting can and should 
be evaluated, the appropriateness of the Bank’s decision-making process, the 
Banks use of projections, the Bank’s individual decisions during the year 
and the Bank’s communication of its policy.  The section ends with some 
recommendations for further improving the analysis, conduct and communi-
cation of monetary policy.  Section 6 provides a discussion of the monetary-
policy debate on the appreciation of the krone and the Bank’s contribution to 
the debate, including a recommendation for improvement to the debate.  Sec-
tion 7 discusses the research at Norges Bank as well as giving some recom-
mendations about future research priorities.  Section 8 summarizes our con-
clusions and lists our recommended improvements to monetary policy and 
institutions in Norway.  An appendix reproduces the Regulation on Mone-
tary Policy of March 29, 2001.  
Norges Bank Watch 2002 
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2  Principles of inflation targeting 
 
 
2.1  A realistic view of monetary policy 
 
A review of monetary policy should start from a realistic view of what 
monetary policy can and cannot do.  Such a view of monetary policy is also 
important in a discussion of the appropriate goals for monetary policy and in 
understanding why an increasing number of countries have selected low in-
flation as the primary goal for monetary policy.  It is sometimes suggested 
that monetary policy is unfairly selected as a scapegoat when other economic 
policies are to blame.  To assess the validity of such suggestions also re-
quires a realistic view of what monetary policy can and cannot do.1 
 
The ultimate objective of economic policy is to guarantee and enhance the 
citizens' welfare.  This is often expressed as a number of separate goals 
which contribute to the citizens' welfare, for instance, efficient resource 
utilization, full and stable employment, high sustainable economic growth, 
price stability, equitable distribution of wealth and income, regional balance 
and environmental protection.  
 
Monetary policy is part of economic policy.  At first, one might think that 
monetary policy should have the same goals as overall economic policy.  
However, since monetary policy only has sustained or persistent effects on a 
limited number of variables affecting economic welfare, it is more appropri-
ate that monetary policy is assigned a subset of goals.  Specifying goals for 
monetary policy that it cannot achieve would, of course, be unproductive and 
could even be counterproductive.  In order to determine which goals are 
most suitable for monetary policy, one must therefore understand the effects 
of monetary policy and what monetary policy can achieve. 
 
How monetary policy affects the economy 
Monetary policy affects real and nominal variables through a number of 
channels, together referred to as the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy.  Central banks normally conduct monetary policy by setting a short 
nominal interest rate, the central bank's instrument rate (in Norway, Norges 
Bank’s overnight deposit rate).  Suppose the central bank lowers the instru-
ment rate.  How is the economy affected?  In the short term, domestic prices 
                                                     
11 Some of this discussion builds on Svensson (1997, 2001). 
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and domestic inflation in industrialized countries are relatively slow to 
change (or sticky).  This means that private-sector inflation expectations for 
the short term are also relatively sticky.  This further implies that central 
banks, by controlling the short nominal interest rate, can also affect the short 
real interest rate: the difference between the short nominal rate and short-
term inflation expectations.  Via market expectations of future real rates, 
longer real rates are also affected.  Thus, the lowering of the instrument rate 
normally lowers short and longer real interest rates. This will increase asset 
prices and aggregate demand for goods and services. 
 
Furthermore, a reduction in the short interest rate normally depreciates the 
domestic currency and hence increases the nominal exchange rate (expressed 
as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency).  Since domestic 
prices in practice are sticky, the domestic currency also depreciates in real 
terms.  That is, the real exchange rate also rises (the real exchange rate can 
be seen as the price of foreign goods and services in terms of domestic goods 
and services or, alternatively, the price of tradable goods in terms of non-
tradable goods and services).  The depreciation of the currency implies that 
the domestic price of imported and exported final goods increases.  Since 
these goods enter the Consumer Price Index (CPI), this means that CPI infla-
tion increases, the extent of which depends on these goods' share in the CPI.  
This is the so-called direct exchange-rate channel to CPI inflation.  This 
effect on CPI inflation usually occurs within about a year, or even quicker.   
 
The fall in short and longer real interest rates mentioned above will stimulate 
consumption and investment and thereby increase aggregate demand.  Since 
output is demand-determined in the short to medium run, higher aggregate 
demand will also raise output.  This is the so-called real-interest-rate chan-
nel to aggregate demand.  The rise in the real exchange rate makes domesti-
cally produced goods less expensive relative to foreign goods.  This in-
creases demand for export and for import-competing goods, which also adds 
to aggregate demand.  This is the exchange rate channel to aggregate de-
mand.  The effects through these two channels usually occur in about a year 
or so. 
 
The monetary-policy literature has also discussed a so-called credit channel 
to aggregate demand.  It works in the same direction as the pure real-
interest-rate effect on aggregate demand.  For simplicity, we can therefore 
include the credit channel in the above real-interest-rate channel to aggregate 
demand.  The real-interest-rate channel also includes effects via changes in 
wealth, for instance, changes in the stockmarket value due to interest-rate 
changes. 
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The impact of monetary policy on inflation 
Having traced the transmission channels to aggregate demand, let us discuss 
the effects on domestic inflation: the rate of change in the prices of the do-
mestically produced goods and services.  (Inflation in domestically produced 
tradable and nontradable final goods and services is the main component of 
CPI inflation; another substantial component is inflation in imported final 
goods.)  As mentioned above, normally we consider actual output as deter-
mined mainly by aggregate demand in the short and medium term.  Potential 
output is the hypothetical output level that would result in the absence of 
price and wage stickiness.  It is largely determined by factors other than 
monetary policy.2  The output gap is the difference between current output 
and potential output.  It can be seen as a measure of general excess demand 
in the economy.  The above transmission channels to aggregate demand are 
hence also channels to the output gap.  The increase in aggregate demand 
and the output gap will then lead to an increase in domestic inflation, be-
cause increased production increases the costs of production and because 
increased demand allows firms to raise prices.  The increase in domestic in-
flation usually occurs within another year or so.  This is the aggregate-
demand channel to domestic inflation. 
 
For a given output-gap level, domestic inflation is also independently af-
fected by production costs, for instance wage costs and costs of intermediate 
inputs, like oil and raw materials.  The depreciation of the currency increases 
the cost of imported intermediate inputs as well as imported final goods, and 
the reduced purchasing power of wages may trigger increased wage de-
mands.  This can be called the production-cost channel to domestic inflation.  
Finally, price and wage setting are affected by expectations of future infla-
tion, since the expected future price level are the natural starting point for 
individual price and wage setting.  This is the expectations channel to do-
mestic inflation.  Any increased inflation expectations that may be generated 
by the lowering of the instrument rate and the resulting increase in activity 
will then independently add to the effect on domestic inflation.  
 
                                                     
2 Potential output is defined inclusive of frictions and imperfections other than price 
and wage stickiness, for instance, imperfect competition and limited transmission of 
information in markets.  Thus, potential output is lower than the hypothetical eco-
nomically efficient output level that would result with highly efficient markets and 
perfect competition.  Increasing potential output towards the efficient output level is 
an important objective for structural policies aiming at improving the degree of 
competition in markets for goods and services and the workings of the labor market.  
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Thus, a reduction in the central bank's instrument rate affects the economy 
through a number of channels with different lags.  The exchange rate and 
short and longer interest rates are usually immediately affected.  Within a 
year or less, there is an effect on CPI inflation, through the direct exchange 
rate channel.  As this first effect is working through, in about a year or so 
there is an increase in output and the output gap.  Through that linkage, 
within another year or so there is a second effect on CPI inflation.  Both ef-
fects work in the same direction, namely to increase inflation.  However, the 
lags mentioned are only very rough rules of thumb.  In practice, the lags and 
the strength of the effects through the different channels vary across chan-
nels and over time, and the effects are spread out over several quarters.  For 
instance, the lag and the strength of the direct exchange rate effect on CPI 
inflation depend on the so-called pass-through of exchange rate changes: the 
degree to which importers pass on exchange rate changes to buyers rather 
than absorbing them in their profit margins.  The pass-through varies consid-
erably depending on the circumstances, for instance, with the perceived per-
sistence of the exchange rate change, the size of the initial profit margins, 
and the price sensitivity of demand for imports.   
 
Furthermore, the economy is subject to a never-ending sequence of unantici-
pated shocks and disturbances, directly and indirectly, to inflation and out-
put.  These include price changes of raw materials and oil, shifts in interna-
tional capital flows, productivity changes, changes in fiscal expenditure and 
taxes, shifts in wage-setting behavior, etc.  Many of these shocks are quite 
difficult to identify, and many occur during the lag between instrument ad-
justment and effects on output and inflation.  Thus, it is worth emphasizing 
that the central bank's control over inflation, output and other macro vari-
ables is quite imperfect. 
 
The long-term effects of monetary policy 
We have seen above how the central bank, by lowering its instrument rate, 
thereby reducing the short real rate and the real exchange rate, can increase 
aggregate demand and output for a few years.  Can the central bank indefi-
nitely maintain a low instrument rate and a depreciated currency in real 
terms and in this way stimulate the economy indefinitely?  The answer is 
definitely no.  In the longer term, the central bank must set its instrument 
rate so that on average the short real rate is equal to the average neutral real 
interest rate.  The neutral real interest rate is the equilibrium real rate that is 
consistent with output equal to potential output.  It is largely determined by 
factors other than monetary policy.  If the central bank tries to maintain a 
short real rate below the neutral real rate for too long, aggregate demand out-
strips potential output, the economy becomes overheated, and inflation in-
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creases to high single-digit, then double-digit inflation, and eventually hy-
per-inflation.3  As history has demonstrated several times, a hyper-
inflationary situation eventually results in a breakdown of the market system 
and a severe economic and financial crisis.  Thus, sustained stimulation of 
the real economy through monetary policy is not a feasible option.  
 
In the long term, monetary policy can only control nominal variables such as 
inflation and the exchange rate.  In the long term, monetary policy cannot 
increase the average level or the growth rate of real variables such as GDP 
and employment, or affect the average level of the real exchange rate.  There 
is evidence that monetary policy that leads to high and/or variable inflation 
is harmful to the real economy and to economic growth, by making the mar-
ket mechanism work less well and by creating unnecessary uncertainty.  
However, once monetary policy brings inflation down to relatively low and 
stable levels, monetary policy has no long-term effects on the average level 
and average growth rate of real variables.  Nevertheless, monetary policy 
can affect the variability of some real variables, as further discussed below.  
 
2.2  Suitable goals for monetary policy 
 
In the long run, output fluctuates around potential output, which is deter-
mined by factors other than monetary policy.4 Thus, there is a conspicuous 
difference between output targets and inflation targets for monetary policy.  
Whereas a long-run inflation target for monetary policy makes eminent 
sense and can be achieved, a long-run level or growth target for output does 
not make sense for monetary policy, because it cannot be achieved.  Put dif-
ferently, in contrast to the inflation target, the long-run output target is not 
subject to monetary policy choice.  Instead it is given by potential output, 
which is largely independent of monetary policy.  In the long term, monetary 
policy can at best provide a stable environment for the real economy.  How-
ever, the fact that monetary policy has effects on the level of real variables in 
the short and medium term creates considerable tensions and temptations 
that need to be faced and handled.  
 
                                                     
3 The mirror image of this is a rapidly increasing rate of growth of the monetary 
base. In order to maintain the short real interest rate below the neutral rate, the cen-
tral bank has to inject money into the economy at a rapidly increasing rate. At higher 
inflation rates, this money-growth channel to inflation becomes dominant. 
4 However, as already noted, bad and volatile monetary policy may well create a 
volatile and uncertain economic environment that deters investment and hence 
growth in potential output.   
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A crucial ingredient in a stable environment for the real economy is a nomi-
nal anchor: an anchor for the nominal variables and private-sector expecta-
tions of future nominal variables.  An increasing number of countries have 
found that price stability, in the sense of low and stable inflation, provides 
the best nominal anchor.  The reason is that the alternative, higher inflation 
has serious negative consequences.  In practice, higher inflation always 
comes with higher variability in inflation.  High and variable inflation im-
pairs the capacity of the market mechanisms to achieve efficient resource 
allocation, and the ensuing uncertainty makes it more difficult for firms, 
consumers and savers to make the right decisions.  It leads to arbitrary and 
inequitable redistributions of incomes and assets, for instance, a shift away 
from small savers to professional investors and from tenants to owners of 
houses and property.  Inflation is effectively theft from small savers and low-
income groups.  High inflation has no lasting positive effects, and the ad-
verse effects eventually become unbearable.  Numerous historical experi-
ences have demonstrated that bringing inflation down from a high level is 
costly; as a rule, a recession with high unemployment is required.  Accord-
ingly, it is important to avoid letting inflation take off in the first place.  For 
these reasons, an increasing number of countries have specified low and sta-
ble inflation as the primary goal for monetary policy.  
 
However, completely disregarding the real consequences of monetary policy 
in the short and medium term and focusing exclusively on controlling infla-
tion at the shortest possible horizon would have bad consequences.  This 
policy has been called “strict inflation targeting” in the literature.  In prac-
tice, in an open economy, it would mean relying almost exclusively on the 
direct exchange rate channel to CPI inflation described above, since it has 
the shortest lag.  For instance, any disturbance to domestic inflation that 
could arise from a number of different sources would be countered by at-
tempts to move the exchange rate so as to let the domestic price of imported 
and exported final goods adjust to stabilize CPI inflation.  This would re-
quire aggressive and volatile policy and lead to considerable volatility in 
interest rates and the nominal and real exchange rate, which would contrib-
ute to increased volatility of output, and surely be detrimental to welfare.  
 
A more moderate policy, called “flexible inflation targeting” in the literature, 
maintains that the primary goal of monetary policy is to achieve low infla-
tion in the form of an inflation target, but it is recognized that some weight 
should be given to stabilizing the business cycle and, consequently, stabiliz-
ing output movements around potential output.  In practice, this means tak-
ing a somewhat more gradual and more moderate approach to monetary pol-
icy, aiming to achieve the inflation target at a somewhat longer horizon (say 
2-3 years) than would be technically feasible (perhaps 3-4 quarters).  It also 
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means accepting that inflation will, in the short term, deviate, sometimes 
quite a bit, from the inflation target.  This approach also relies more on the 
aggregate demand channel than the direct exchange rate channel to inflation.  
 
2.3 The tradeoff between inflation variability and output  
variability 
 
The tradeoff between inflation variability and output-gap variability and the 
choice between strict and flexible inflation targeting have been discussed 
extensively in the monetary-policy literature, for instance, in several papers 
presented at the Jackson Hole conferences in 1996 and 1999 (Federal Re-
serve Bank of Kansas City 1996, 1999).  The tradeoff is often illustrated as 
in figure 2.1, with inflation variability around a given inflation target meas-
ured along the horizontal axis and output-gap variability measured along the 
vertical axis.  The intersection of the axes corresponds to zero variability of 
inflation and the output gap, that is, inflation always equal to the inflation 
target and the output gap always equal to zero.  Because of the complex 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy, unpredictable shocks, impre-
cise control and inevitable uncertainty, zero variability is a completely infea-
sible outcome.  Instead, the curve shows the most efficient and feasible 
combinations of inflation and output-gap variability that monetary policy can 
achieve.  Points above and to the right of the curve correspond to inefficient 
monetary policy, where either inflation variability or output-gap variability, 
or both, could be reduced by better monetary policy.  Points below and to the 
left of the curve correspond to outcomes that are infeasible.  The point SIT 
corresponds to strict inflation targeting, when the central bank concentrates 
on stabilizing inflation without considering the consequences for output-gap 
variability.  It results in the lowest feasible variability of inflation but high 
variability of the output gap.  A point like FIT corresponds to flexible infla-
tion targeting, where the central bank puts some weight on stabilizing out-
put-gap variability.  It leads to somewhat increased inflation variability but 
reduced output-gap variability.  The point SOT, to the right outside the fig-
ure, corresponds to “strict output-gap targeting,” when the central bank puts 
all weight on stabilizing the output gap.  It would lead to very high inflation 
variability.   
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Figure 2.1.  The tradeoff between inflation variability and output-gap variability 
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Discussions among policymakers, experts and researchers in the monetary-
policy area have by now resulted in considerable agreement that flexible in-
flation targeting is the best compromise for monetary policy.  There is also 
general agreement that inflation-targeting central banks in industrialized 
countries in practice conduct policy in this way.  That is, they aim to stabi-
lize inflation around the inflation target but also to some extent stabilize out-
put around potential output—acknowledging that because of the tradeoff, 
unpredictable shocks, uncertainty and unavoidably imperfect control there 
will always remain some variability in both inflation and the output gap.  For 
a small, open, oil-producing and less diversified economy like Norway, the 
remaining variability is likely to be substantial.  
 
However, one important mechanism for improving the tradeoff is by achiev-
ing credibility, in the sense of anchoring inflation expectations on the infla-
tion target.  Shocks to inflation expectations are historically an important 
source of variability in inflation and output, since shifts in inflation expecta-
tions have independent effects on future inflation—recall the direct expecta-
tions channel to domestic inflation mentioned above.  Shifts in inflation ex-
pectations also cause additional indirect disturbances to output and inflation 
by affecting real interest rates and exchange rates.  As a result, volatility in 
inflation expectations shifts the curve in figure 2.1 up and to the right and 
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worsens the variability tradeoff.  Conversely, more stable inflation expecta-
tions anchored on the inflation target improve the tradeoff, shift the curve 
down and to the left, and allow inflation variability or output-gap variability 
(or both) to fall.  This is also because inflation expectations anchored on the 
inflation target create a strong tendency for actual inflation to revert to the 
inflation target and, everything else equal, mean that monetary policy needs 
to be less active.  Interest rates and output need to move less to counter un-
favorable movements in inflation expectations.  The economy is to some 
extent put on autopilot.  This situation is every inflation-targeting central 
banker's dream.  Although central bankers often may seem obsessed with 
credibility, this obsession is for good reason.   
 
The feasibility and desirability of exchange-rate stabilization 
Inflation targeting in an open economy will include an element of implied 
exchange-rate stabilization.  Independent movements in the exchange rate, 
due to shocks and changes in international investors’ sentiments, for in-
stance, will have, through the direct and indirect exchange-rate channels dis-
cussed above, an impact on the CPI.  For instance, through the direct ex-
change-rate channel to the CPI, an appreciation of the currency will, every-
thing else equal, reduce the domestic-currency price of the imported final 
goods that enter the CPI and thereby lower CPI inflation.  An inflation tar-
geting-central bank would then to some extent prevent the lower inflation by 
more expansionary policy, which would moderate the currency appreciation.  
Importantly, this implied exchange-rate stabilization is not for its own sake; 
it is derived from the objectives of stabilizing inflation and the output gap.  
 
A separate issue is the desirability and feasibility of independent stabiliza-
tion of the exchange rate, that is, stabilization of the exchange rate for its 
own sake.  It is certainly possible for the central bank to stabilize either the 
interest rate or the exchange rate somewhat, at the cost of increased variabil-
ity of inflation and/or the output gap.  Is it desirable for the central bank to 
do so?  Except in situations of financial fragility with concerns about the 
stability of the payment and financial system, we find it difficult to see good 
reasons for such stabilization at the cost of increased inflation and output-
gap variability.  
 
It is sometimes suggested that central banks have an additional instrument 
beyond the instrument rate, namely so-called sterilized foreign-exchange 
interventions, and that central banks can affect the exchange rate independ-
ently from the instrument rate.  More precisely, sterilized foreign-exchange 
interventions are central-bank purchases and sales of foreign exchange (in 
practice, foreign-currency treasury bills) while maintaining the instrument 
Norges Bank Watch 2002 
24 
 
 
rate at an unchanged level (which then may require coordinated open-market 
operations (in practice repurchase transactions in domestic treasury bills) in 
the domestic money market to undo (sterilize) the impact on the domestic 
money supply).  A nonsterilized foreign-exchange intervention allows the 
intervention to change the instrument rate and is equivalent to a standard 
open-market operation to adjust the instrument rate.  The result of much re-
search and practical experience is that sterilized foreign-exchange interven-
tions normally have only small and short-lived effects.  The experience from 
sterilized interventions by Norges Bank does not contradict this view.  Re-
search and experience has, however, that there is one situation when steril-
ized interventions may have more substantial effects, namely when they are 
interpreted as signals or threats of future interest-rate changes.  But a trans-
parent central bank has much better ways of sending such signals.   
 
There is no evidence that sterilized foreign-exchange interventions by them-
selves could have any material effect on exchange rate variability.  We see 
no reason why a transparent inflation-targeter should undertake foreign-
exchange interventions rather than standard open-market operations.  
 
Increased credibility in the sense of increasingly stable inflation expectations 
around the inflation target will reduce a major source of shocks to exchange 
rates.  Thus, successful and credible flexible inflation targeting is likely to 
contribute to less variability of exchange rates.  However, exchange rates are 
by nature volatile asset prices and are affected by a number of shocks be-
yond inflation expectations.  Such shocks will continue to cause unavoidable 
exchange-rate variability under inflation targeting.   
 
Furthermore, currency markets are notorious for inducing both temporary 
and more permanent exchange-rate movements that are difficult to under-
stand and often seem quite irrational.  During the first few years of inflation 
targeting in Sweden, the krona appeared to many observers and to Sveriges 
Riksbank to be priced surprisingly low by international currency markets.  
During the inflation-targeting regime of the U.K., the pound appears to many 
observers and to the Bank of England to be priced surprisingly high.  When 
international currency markets persistently price a currency above or below 
what seems to be a more reasonable real exchange rate, the only reasonable 
monetary policy seems to be to accept and live with this.  For reasons dis-
cussed above, attempts by monetary policy to affect a real exchange rate in 
the long term are normally doomed to fail and only bring further costs in 
terms of increased inflation and output-gap variability.  
 
But is it not possible to stabilize short-term movements in the real exchange 
rate without attempting to stabilize it at some particular level in the long run?  
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In theory it is possible to add another “stabilization objective,” namely the 
stability of the real exchange rate around its equilibrium rate.  Furthermore, 
this equilibrium real exchange rate is ever-shifting due to shocks that change 
the underlying real equilibrium of the economy.  Estimating the equilibrium 
real exchange rate is therefore a substantial challenge.  Also, any stabiliza-
tion of the real exchange rate would normally imply more variability of in-
flation and output gap.  In practice, stabilization of the real exchange rate 
around an estimated time-varying real exchange rate is likely to be too ambi-
tious and fraught with difficulties.  Realistically, inflation targeting central 
banks will have to abstain from any real exchange-rate stabilization beyond 
that implied by the real exchange rate effects on inflation and the output gap. 
 
2.4  Fiscal expansion and the real exchange rate 
 
Norway is unique among the industrialized countries in its large oil revenues 
and the strong financial position of the government, due to these revenues 
and the Government Petroleum Fund (the fund of accumulated oil revenues 
that the government has invested abroad).  As discussed in more detail in 
section 4, the new guidelines for fiscal policy of March 2001 imply a gradu-
ally more expansionary fiscal policy in the future, with great temptations and 
risks for discretionary even more expansionary policy.  A fiscal expansion is 
likely to lead to a real appreciation of the krone.  One way to see this is to 
note that increased fiscal expenditure will to a large extent fall on domesti-
cally produced goods and services, especially private and public services.  
Increased demand for nontradable goods and services will lead to an increase 
in their relative price to tradable goods.  The increase in this relative price 
serves to attract labor and other productive resources from the sectors pro-
ducing traded goods and services, for instance, manufactures, to the sectors 
producing nontradable goods and services.  This process will show up as 
reduced competitiveness of the tradable-goods sector in Norway and will 
most likely lead to reduced output, employment and profits in the tradable-
goods sector.  
 
The rise in the relative price of nontradable goods corresponds to a fall in the 
real exchange rate and thus a real appreciation of the krone.  It is a logical 
consequence of a fiscal expansion.5  Furthermore, a permanent fiscal expan-
                                                     
5 In line with the discussion in section 2.4, we do not imply that fiscal policy is the 
only source of movements in the real exchange rates in general and the recent appre-
ciation of the krone in particular.  It is possible that recent strong real-wage growth 
in Norway will reduce future potential output and potential employment and require 
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sion, which is implied by the new guidelines, is likely to lead to a permanent 
real appreciation as well as, as we shall see, an even larger real appreciation 
in the short and medium term.6   
 
The increased future aggregate demand will imply increased future output 
and income.  Then, Norwegian households anticipate higher disposable in-
comes in the future, either from increased demand and income or from lower 
taxes in the future.  Via a wealth effect, this will tend to increase current 
consumption and aggregate demand.  Keeping current consumption and ag-
gregate demand in balance with current output and avoiding an overheated 
economy requires a higher real interest rate, corresponding to a higher neu-
tral real interest rate, in order to induce the corresponding amount of saving.7  
 
A permanent real appreciation and increased real interest rate in the short 
and medium term will, everything else equal, lead to an even larger current 
real appreciation, a real exchange-rate overshooting.  The reason is that the 
krone has to appreciate to such a high level that it can depreciate in real 
terms to the long-term permanent level.  This way, for international inves-
tors, the real return from investing in Norway, taking into account both the 
real interest rate in Norway and the real depreciation of the krone, will re-
main approximately equal to the real return in the rest of the world.  This is 
an equilibrium condition in the international capital market.  
 
Importantly, these adjustments of the real exchange rate and the real interest 
rate are equilibrium adjustments of the real economy due to the anticipated 
future fiscal expansion, independent of monetary policy.  Monetary policy 
cannot prevent these adjustments; it can at most delay them somewhat, but at 
the cost of more inflation and, as we shall see, probably a future recession.  
When monetary policy is directed towards maintaining low and stable infla-
tion, the adjustment of the real exchange rate occurs mainly through move-
ments of the nominal exchange rate.  Adjustment of the real exchange rate 
via the nominal exchange rate has the advantage that it can easily be undone, 
if the underlying real sources of the adjustment in the economy, in this case 
the fiscal expansion, changes.  For instance, if fiscal policy in the future 
                                                                                                                            
a higher real interest rate and thus more contractionary monetary policy to close the 
output gap.  The higher real interest rate then induces a current real appreciation.   
6 Even in the very long run, there need not be constant returns to scale in the produc-
tion of nontradeable goods and services, due to specific factors of production in lim-
ited supply and congestion effects.  Therefore, the real appreciation may persist also 
in the long run.  
7 This is essentially the same kind of argument as the “new economy” with its in-
creased output growth implying a higher neutral real interest rate. 
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should change in a more restrictive direction, the real currency appreciation 
can be undone by a nominal currency depreciation.   
 
Monetary policy can delay the initial real currency appreciation somewhat, 
by focusing on stabilizing the nominal exchange rate and preventing the 
nominal appreciation of the currency, but, as we shall see, at a substantial 
cost to the economy.  Delaying the initial real appreciation involves easier 
monetary policy and initially a lower nominal interest rate.  Because the 
nominal price level is sticky in the short run, this would delay the real appre-
ciation for some time.  However, after a few quarters, the easier monetary 
policy would result in increasing inflation, especially since the adjustment of 
the real exchange rate and the real interest rate to avoid an overheated econ-
omy has been delayed.  Then, the required real appreciation instead arises 
through an increase in the domestic price level in an overheated economy, 
rather than through a fall in the nominal exchange rate.  Eventually, the same 
real appreciation has been achieved through a rise in inflation and a resulting 
increase in the price level.  
 
However, achieving the real appreciation through inflation in an overheated 
economy has the large disadvantage that inflation in practice has consider-
able inertia.  Thus, the high inflation will stay for some time.  The higher 
inflation has the undesirable consequences we have already noted above, that 
it brings more uncertainty, impairs the capacity of the market mechanisms to 
achieve efficient resource allocation, makes it more difficult for firms, con-
sumers and savers to make the right decisions, and leads to arbitrary and in-
equitable redistributions of incomes and wealth.  Furthermore, the inertia in 
inflation means that the real-exchange-rate adjustment can go too far, lead-
ing to an excess real appreciation and hence an overvalued currency.  Then a 
boom and expansion can quickly turn into bust and contraction.  A real de-
preciation is then necessary to undo the overvalued currency, and with a sta-
ble nominal exchange rate, this requires deflation and a fall in the domestic 
price level and nominal wages, which normally requires a deep recession.  
The experience of the Nordic countries and the U.K. in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s give excellent examples of this tendency to boom and bust under 
a fixed exchange rate.  With a flexible exchange rate, the desired real depre-
ciation instead comes through a quick rise in the exchange rate, a nominal 
depreciation.  This is indeed the reason why monetary policy aimed at low 
and stable inflation with a flexible exchange rate is considered superior to a 
fixed exchange rate—and indeed the reason why the fixed exchange rate was 
effectively abandoned in the late 90s in Norway (and earlier in Finland, the 
U.K. and Sweden).  
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Thus, it is quite costly and eventually futile to use monetary policy in an at-
tempt to prevent equilibrium adjustment of the real exchange rate due to un-
derlying changes in the real economy.  
 
2.5  Summary 
 
In the long term, monetary policy can only control a nominal variable, such 
as either inflation or the nominal exchange rate.  It cannot increase the aver-
age level or the growth rate of real variables such as GDP and employment, 
or affect the average level of the real exchange rate.  At best it can reduce the 
variability of real variables somewhat.  In the short and medium term, mone-
tary policy has effects on both nominal and real variables.  However, any 
fine-tuning is prevented by the complex transmission mechanism of mone-
tary policy, varying lags and strength of the effects through different chan-
nels, unpredictable shocks and inherent uncertainty.  There is general inter-
national support for a regime of flexible inflation targeting, where inflation 
is stabilized around a low inflation target in the medium term rather than at 
the shortest possible horizon, a gradual and measured policy response avoids 
creating unnecessary variability in the real economy, and required real ex-
change-rate adjustments are achieved through a flexible exchange rate.   
 
A permanent future fiscal expansion is likely to lead to a permanent real ap-
preciation of the currency, a current increase in the neutral real interest rate 
and a larger short-run than long-run real appreciation of the currency.  At-
tempts to delay such an equilibrium adjustment of the real exchange rate by 
stabilizing the nominal exchange is likely to be quite costly and result in 
more variable inflation and output gap, without in the end preventing the real 
exchange rate movements.  
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3 Optimal delegation of monetary policy and the 
institutional framework for monetary policy in 
Norway 
 
 
3.1  Optimal democratic delegation of monetary policy 
 
The situation in Norway differs from that in other European countries with 
regard to the central bank’s independence and the extent to which monetary 
policy is (formally) delegated (we also discuss below to what extent mone-
tary policy is delegated in practice in Norway).  This motivates a discussion 
of the optimal delegation of monetary policy in a representative democracy.  
 
In democracies, the government and the parliament are ultimately responsi-
ble for economic policy and accountable to the people.  This is also the case 
for monetary policy.  It does not preclude, however, that the political au-
thorities may find it appropriate to delegate the formulation and implementa-
tion of the policy to independent authorities when this is considered the most 
efficient means of achieving the objectives of economic policy.  A represen-
tative democracy is in itself based on delegation—the people delegates legis-
lative powers to parliament, but holds the political authorities accountable 
through general elections; the administration of justice is delegated to inde-
pendent courts which are to judge in accordance with the laws passed by 
parliament.  
 
Delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is obviously not 
a goal in itself.  It is solely motivated by its advantages when it comes to 
achieving the economic policy objectives.  What are these advantages?  This 
question has been thoroughly analyzed in academic research.  There is also 
plenty of practical experience from different countries.  Research and 
practical experience show that the most important parts of a successful dele-
gation can be summarized in three points: 
 
(1) Mandate.  The political authorities define a clear goal for monetary pol-
icy, preferably legislated, as is the case in an increasing number of countries.  
According to the discussion in section 2, low and stable inflation, with some 
weight on stability of the output gap, is the most appropriate goal for mone-
tary policy.  
 
(2) Independence.  The central bank is given “operational independence” 
(sometimes also called “instrument independence”), which implies two 
things.  First, the central bank must have an independent management, so 
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that it can pursue its monetary-policy goal free of short-term political pres-
sure from the government and from various interest groups.  The terms of 
office and the principles for appointing and removing the central bank’s 
management must be set up with a view to this.  Second, the central bank 
must be given full control over the instruments for monetary and exchange-
rate policy, that is, control over open market operations and foreign-
exchange interventions.     
   
(3) Accountability.  An important condition, not only for democratic control 
but also for efficient delegation, is that the central bank is held accountable 
to the political bodies for the monetary policy conducted.  Accountability 
serves several purposes.  In a democracy like Norway, it is a matter of prin-
ciple that operational independence by any agency is accompanied by ac-
countability.  It also creates incentives for the central bank to pursue the 
goals it has been assigned.  Accountability requires transparency, both in the 
form of a clear goal for monetary policy and a transparent reporting system 
for the central bank’s policy actions and the analysis that motivates these 
actions, so that the bank’s performance can be evaluated by external observ-
ers.  The central bank’s policy actions can, for instance, be reported and mo-
tivated in the central bank’s publications, but also through subsequent—and 
public—questionings of the central-bank management in parliament.  If the 
central bank is to be held genuinely accountable, specific sanctions may be 
needed, in the event that the central bank does not achieve the established 
goal in a satisfactory manner.  This is the case in New Zealand, where the 
governor of the central bank is personally responsible for fulfilling the goal 
for monetary policy, and he or she can be removed from office, if mistakes 
in monetary policy result in the goals not being fulfilled.   In the U.K., if in-
flation deviates more than one percentage point from the announced inflation 
target, the governor of the Bank of England is obliged to send an open letter 
to the Chancellor of Exchequer, stating the reasons for the breach, what ac-
tion the Bank is taking to deal with it, and when inflation is expected to re-
turn to the target. 
 
Another important element of political and democratic control is an override 
clause.  In extreme circumstances, such as disasters or major international 
political or economic disturbances, the government or parliament should 
have the power to quickly issue new laws or decrees about monetary policy, 
temporarily absolving the central bank of its obligation to pursue the previ-
ously announced goal, for instance, low inflation.  In view of democratic 
control, it is essential that this is made public and that the central bank can-
not be required to depart from the announced objective secretly.  This re-
duces the risk of short-term abuse, for instance by stimulating the economy 
before a general election in order win votes in the short run. 
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What are the benefits of an executive delegation in relation to the three 
points above? Decades of research and practical experience show that direct 
government control over monetary policy entails, as a rule, great temptations 
to abuse monetary policy in order to gain short-term benefits.  One may, for 
instance, be tempted to increase the level of output and lower unemployment 
in the short-term, often also to gain political advantages for the political 
party in power, not least in connection with general elections.  
 
The general public, trade unions and firms—not least financial markets—
sooner or later realize the ramifications of these temptations.  This tends to 
lead to high inflation expectations and thus high wage increases, high long 
interest rates and high actual inflation.  Confronted with this, the government 
often finds the short-term costs too high—in the form of recession—of con-
ducting a tight monetary policy aimed at low inflation.  The government 
therefore shifts towards an accommodating policy, thus allowing inflation to 
take off and the currency to fall.  The high inflation expectations are thereby 
fulfilled.  The government’s repeated assertions that the goal of price stabil-
ity remains firm may then easily lose credibility, and various explanations 
indicating that this is merely a temporary departure from long-run policy are 
not convincing.  Public announcements from the Swedish government and 
from the Riksbank during the 1970s and the 1980s provide many such ex-
amples. 
 
Delegating monetary policy according to the three points above is therefore a 
means for parliament and the government of strengthening the credibility of 
the announced policy.  It should be emphasized that the purpose of opera-
tional independence for the central bank is not to achieve any other goal than 
the announced one; instead the principle is to increase the likelihood of 
achieving the democratically established goal.  The experience of many 
countries reveals the advantages of such delegation (see, for instance, Calm-
fors et al. (1997)).  Numerous studies show that countries with a clear dele-
gation of monetary policy to an operationally independent central bank have 
been more successful in keeping inflation at bay, without sacrificing other 
economic policy goals such as economic growth and stability of output and 
employment.  
 
Given these experiences, many countries in Europe and in the rest of the 
world have implemented institutional reforms in order to permit a clear dele-
gation of monetary policy.  This is the case for the countries that have en-
tered the EMU, the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, but also for 
several countries in Europe outside the Monetary Union, for instance, the 
U.K. and Sweden. 
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3.2  The institutional framework for monetary policy in Norway8 
 
The institutional framework for monetary policy in Norway differs from the 
ideal framework discussed above.  In Norway, there is no legislated goal for 
monetary policy, and there is no formal operational independence of the 
central bank.  In an international comparison of central-bank legislation by 
Cukierman (1992), Norges Bank ranks as the least independent central bank 
among the developed countries.  Furthermore, Cukierman’s ranking was 
done before many countries all over the world reformed their central-bank 
legislation in the direction of increased central-bank independence.   
 
The Central Bank Law (Sentralbankloven) was passed by the Storting (the 
Parliament) in 1985, before the modern discussion and reform of central-
bank legislation, and has not been changed since.  It states (section 2) that 
Norges Bank “shall conduct its operations in accordance with the economic 
policy guidelines drawn up by the government authorities and with the coun-
try's international commitments,” and that “[b]efore the Bank makes deci-
sions of particular importance, the matter shall be submitted to the Ministry 
of Finance.”  Furthermore, the government “may adopt resolutions regarding 
the operations of the Bank.  Such resolutions may take the form of general 
rules or instructions in individual cases.” Thus, the government has the right 
to give direct instructions to Norges Bank, either in the form of general rules 
or specific instructions in individual cases.  In particular, the government can 
in an instruction reject the Bank’s interest-rate decision.  
 
The right of instruction of the government comes with several important 
checks, though:  The instruction must be in the form of “King in Council,” 
which is a more formal government decision than usual.  “The Bank shall be 
given the opportunity to state its opinion before such resolutions are passed” 
in the form of a letter.  “The Storting shall be notified of resolutions [by the 
government regarding the operations of the Bank] as soon as possible.”  The 
notification must be public and include the letter from the Bank.  After the 
Storting has received such a notification, it could in a plenary session in-
struct the government to conduct an economic policy in line with the views 
of the majority of the Storting and this way force the government to accept 
the Bank’s interest-rate decision.  Clearly, there would be considerable pub-
lic discussion if right of instruction was used to overrule a decision by Nor-
                                                     
8 Norges Bank Watch 2001 provides a more detailed discussion of the central bank 
legislation in Norway.  Svensson (2001) provides a more detailed discussion of gov-
ernance and committees of central banks, with special reference to New Zealand. 
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ges Bank. The right of instruction has never been formally used to overrule 
the Bank. 
 
There has been some discussion of how the Central Bank Law is supposed to 
be applied (see Smith (1994)).  The understanding today seems to be that, if 
the government instructs Norges Bank to act in opposition to the best judg-
ment of the Bank, the governor of Norges Bank will resign. 
   
Regarding accountability, the Central Bank Law states that Norges Bank 
shall submit annual reports and accounts to the government.  These reports 
shall be made available to the Storting.  The Ministry of Finance shall report 
to the Storting concerning activities in Norges Bank at least once a year, and 
more frequently if special circumstances dictate.  These reports are included 
in the Kredittmelding (the Credit Report), an annual statement from the Min-
istry of Finance to the Storting.  This statement also reports on a number of 
other public institutions in the credit markets.   
 
The Kredittmelding includes the Bank’s own evaluation of its policy, but 
there is no separate evaluation of the Bank’s policy by the Ministry of Fi-
nance.  There are no regular hearings in the Storting or elsewhere with offi-
cials of Norges Bank.  Most of the discussion of monetary policy in Norway 
occurs in the media and in academic research and discussions.  Norges Bank 
Watch so far provides the only regular and more thorough scrutiny of mone-
tary policy and institutions in Norway.   
 
The institutional framework in practice 
In practice, fortunately, a system of delegation of monetary policy has 
evolved, which implies that the government does not exercise direct control 
over monetary policy.  Instead, the government issues instructions in the 
form of general rules for monetary policy, more precisely specifying the na-
ture of the monetary policy regime and the objectives of monetary policy, 
which apply for several years.  Thus, in March 29, 2001, the government 
issued a Regulation of Monetary Policy that specified an inflation target of 
2.5% for Norges Bank.   
 
In practice, Norges Bank has significant operational independence, in the 
sense that it independently decides what level of its instrument rate (the 
Bank’s overnight deposit rate) is appropriate.  Before announcing and im-
plementing its decision, it is still obliged to inform the government through 
the Ministry of Finance.  As mentioned, the government has never formally 
rejected the Bank’s instrument decision; doing so would have been a major 
political event.  Furthermore, if that would happen, the presumption is that 
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the governor of Norges Bank would resign.  Thus, with a strong governor 
and a strong reputation for Norges Bank, it would seem quite difficult for the 
government to interfere with interest-rate decisions, once the government 
has issued a regulation specifying the objectives of monetary policy.  On the 
other hand, a weak governor and a weak Bank might of course adapt inter-
est-rate decisions to what the government is likely to prefer, in order to avoid 
conflict.  
 
Even if in practice a suitable delegation of monetary policy has currently 
been established, it is not safeguarded in the legislation about the institu-
tional framework.  A new government could interrupt the current practice 
and issue new instructions that would fundamentally change the monetary-
policy regime and even move to day-to-day control of monetary policy, if 
the Storting does not object.  For instance, the government could any time 
instruct Norges Bank to weaken the krone to some specified level and 
thereby take direct control over monetary policy.  Thus, a legislated reform 
that would safeguard and strengthen the current practice would seem to be 
desirable.  
 
The Executive Board  
Monetary-policy decisions are made by the Executive Board of Norges 
Bank.  The Board consists of seven members, appointed by the government.  
The governor and deputy governor are always members of the board.  They 
are appointed for terms of six years, and can be once reappointed.  The other 
five members are appointed for four-year terms.  Every year two or three 
members retire.  They can be reappointed to a total term of 12 years.   
 
There is no requirement that the five members must be experts in monetary 
policy or related areas, like macroeconomics or financial markets.   Should 
Board members be experts in monetary policy or nonexperts?  Nonexperts 
have the advantage that there is a larger group of possible candidates to 
choose from, and therefore it is easier to find respected candidates who 
would contribute to the general legitimacy of the committee.  However, a 
lack of expertise in monetary policy means reduced competence for inde-
pendent assessment and capacity to participate in the technical discussion 
required in efficient inflation targeting.  Nonexperts therefore easily become 
dominated by committee members with more expertise.  There are thus good 
reasons to limit appointments to candidates with expertise in monetary pol-
icy, macroeconomics or financial economics.  In line with this, the Bank of 
England has no nonexperts on its Monetary Policy Committee, and all ap-
pointments to the new Executive Board of the Riksbank in 1999 were ex-
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perts (more recently a controversial political rather than professional ap-
pointment has occurred). 
 
This issue is related to whether monetary policy is a political or technical 
activity.  In Norway, once the government has specified the objectives, 
monetary policy is overwhelmingly a technical activity; how to best fulfill 
the stated objectives, more precisely, the given inflation target.  Then mone-
tary policy is best done by experts.  
 
This also implies that appointments to the Executive Board with the purpose 
of sectoral, political or other special-interest representation are mistaken.  
Not only is it unnecessary, but it brings special-interest conflicts into the 
Board, which might cause deadlocks or risk policy serving special interests 
rather than the country as a whole. 
 
By custom, the main political parties represented in the Storting are invited 
to nominate candidates for the five members Executive Board other than the 
governor and deputy governor.  As far as we know, the government has not 
opposed these nominations, except that the government has imposed limita-
tions on the gender composition of the Board.  The custom of inviting nomi-
nations from political parties has no legal basis.  It seems to increase the risk 
of sectoral, political or special-interest appointments.  We therefore recom-
mend that the custom be discontinued.   
 
3.3  The monetary-policy guidelines 
 
The current objectives for Norges Bank are specified in the new guidelines 
for monetary policy, the Regulation on Monetary Policy adopted on March 
29, 2001 (reproduced in appendix A.1).  The first three paragraphs read (the 
sentences have been numbered for easy reference): 
 
§ 1. 
(1) Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian 
krone’s national and international value, contributing to stable ex-
pectations concerning exchange rate developments.  (2) At the same 
time, monetary policy shall underpin fiscal policy by contributing to 
stable developments in output and employment. 
 
(3) Norges Bank is responsible for the implementation of monetary 
policy. 
 
(4) Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall, in ac-
cordance with the first paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable 
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inflation.  (5) The operational target of monetary policy shall be an-
nual consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over 
time. 
 
(6) In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from 
changes in interest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary tem-
porary disturbances shall not be taken into account. 
 
§ 2. 
Norges Bank shall regularly publish the assessments that form the 
basis for the implementation of monetary policy. 
 
§ 3. 
The international value of the Norwegian krone is determined by the 
exchange rates in the foreign exchange market. 
 
In addition to these guidelines, the Stortingsmelding (the Storting Report) 
No. 29 from the Ministry of Finance of March, 2001 states that “[c]onsumer 
price inflation is expected to remain within an interval of +/-1 percentage 
point around the target.” 
 
The monetary-policy guidelines are not, unfortunately, internally consistent.  
Sentence (1) specifies stability in both the krone’s national value (which is 
the reciprocal of the price level) and international value (which is the recip-
rocal of the nominal exchange rate) as objectives for monetary policy.  Fur-
thermore, the sentence says that monetary policy should contribute to stable 
expectations about exchange rate developments.  As discussed in section 2, 
especially section 2.4, stability in the price level and the nominal exchange 
rate cannot be reconciled, especially when a fiscal expansion induces a real 
currency appreciation.  Fortunately, sentences (3)-(6) resolve this conflict by 
stating that monetary policy shall be oriented towards low and stable infla-
tion and by specifying an inflation target of 2.5% per year for CPI inflation 
adjusted for direct effects from interest rates, taxes, excise duties and ex-
traordinary temporary disturbances.  Sentence (2) states that the Banks shall 
also put some weight on stable output and employment.  Sentences (2)-(6) 
thus imply that the monetary policy is one of flexible inflation targeting as 
discussed in section 2, except that it would be more precise to mention either 
the “output gap” or the “employment gap” (the gap between output and po-
tential output, and the gap between employment and potential employment) 
instead of “output and employment”.  Mentioning both gaps is redundant 
since they are highly correlated. 
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A natural and logical improvement of the monetary-policy guidelines is to 
delete sentence (1) and to move sentence (2) to after sentence (5). 
 
3.4  Potential improvements of the institutional framework 
 
The most important improvement of the institutional framework is a full-
fledged institutional reform, requiring a new law for Norges Bank, as dis-
cussed above and similar to those that have been undertaken in the U.K. or 
Sweden, with the three characteristics emphasized above—a legislated man-
date, operational independence and accountability.  The setup in the U.K. 
where the government formulates the inflation target would be most similar 
to the Norwegian tradition.9  Thus, we recommend: 
 
• A full-fledged institutional reform, similar to those that have been under-
taken in the U.K. or Sweden.  The reform should specify a mandate for 
price stability, operational independence, and accountability for Norges 
Bank. 
 
Within the existing legislative framework, there are, however, several poten-
tial improvements of the framework.  We recommend: 
 
• In order to resolve the inherent inconsistency between exchange-rate 
stability and low and stable inflation for Norway, the references to ex-
                                                     
9 In February, 2002, Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) proposed a change to the Central Bank 
Law in Stortinget (Fremskrittspartiet, 2002).  The main elements of the proposal are:  
• The right of the Ministry of Finance to instruct Norges Bank should be re-
moved.  The obligation to consult the Ministry of Finance ahead of decisions 
must be removed. 
• The inflation target should be implicitly stated in the law.  There should be no 
reference to exchange rate stability or level. 
• The Bank should receive operational independence. 
• The Bank should submit semi-annual or annual reports to the Parliament.  
• The Government should appoint members of the Executive Board that have a 
high level of competence and that are politically independent. Moreover, the 
Government should have the right to replace board members that do not fully 
subscribe to the inflation target. 
Thus, this proposal largely agrees with the conventional wisdom about the appropri-
ate institutional framework for monetary policy.  Nevertheless, the proposal was 
rejected by the Parliament in April.  The only votes in favor of the proposal were 
from the FrP itself.  The minister of finance stated in a letter to the Storting that he 
wanted to consider some elements in the legal framework for Norges Bank during 
2002.   
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change-rate stability in the monetary-policy guidelines should be de-
leted.  (More precisely, the first sentence should be deleted and the 
second sentence moved to after the fifth sentence.) 
• The appointments to the Executive Board should be of experts on mone-
tary policy and related areas, for instance macroeconomics and financial 
markets, so that members can independently contribute to the achieve-
ment of the announced objectives for monetary policy.  
• The custom to invite political parties to nominate members to the Execu-
tive Board should be discontinued, in order to avoid the risk of sectoral, 
political or special-interest representation and related risks of deadlocks 
or policy directed to special interests rather than the country as a whole. 
• Nonattributed minutes and attributed voting records from the Executive 
Board should be published, in order to strengthen the accountability and 
further improve transparency.  These minutes should note without attri-
bution to individual members which issues were discussed and what ar-
guments were presented, as well as how individual members have voted.  
• The essential material on monetary policy submitted to or formulated by 
the Executive Board, for instance, the Strateginotat (Notes on Strategy) 
outlining policy for the next four months should be published, in order to 
strengthen accountability and further improve transparency.  
• Several additional improvements to strengthen the accountability of 
Norges Bank should be undertaken:  (1) An evaluation by the Ministry 
of Finance of how Norges Bank has conducted monetary policy and 
achieved the stated objectives for monetary policy should be included in 
the Kredittmelding (the report by the Ministry of Finance to the Stort-
ing).  (2) Regular hearings on monetary policy should be held in the 
Storting with the governor and other officials of Norges Bank, with the 
assistance of experts appointed by the Storting.  (3) An annual or bian-
nual conference on monetary policy in Norway should be held, financed 
by Norges Bank but organized independently, for instance, by an aca-
demic institution, and open to the general public and media.  At such a 
conference, papers evaluating monetary policy by the Bank could be 
presented by national and international experts followed by comments 
by Bank officials and public discussion. 
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4  The impact of fiscal policy and the phase-in  
of oil revenues 
 
 
4.1  Challenges for economic policy in Norway  
 
In the last ten years, Norway’s economic growth and general macroeco-
nomic performance have been impressive.  The present purchasing-power 
corrected GDP per capita is 46% above EU average.  The rate of unemploy-
ment has been below 4% for a number of years, and inflation is under con-
trol.  Private consumption (purchasing power corrected) is however not lar-
ger than the EU-average, reflecting that Norway exports capital on a grand 
scale.  
 
The government is becoming increasingly wealthy.  In 2000 and 2001, the 
general government’s budget surplus was close to 15% of GDP.  Despite 
future population aging and large expected future pension liabilities, the is-
sue of fiscal policy sustainability is much less of a present concern in Nor-
way compared to most other European welfare states.  The accumulated 
funds represent a great opportunity for Norwegian policy makers to insure 
and increase general welfare in the next decades.  Compared to other Euro-
pean governments, the Norwegian government has a lot more room for fiscal 
maneuver.  This new fiscal freedom, however, also brings with it several 
pitfalls:  Fiscal discipline may erode, leading to excessive and wasteful rent-
seeking, government bureaucratization and spending as well as distorting 
private sector incentives to work and increase productivity.  The world oil 
price may drop and remain low for a long time, undermining the sustainabil-
ity of the Norwegian welfare state.  Rent-seeking, lack of fiscal discipline 
and unsustainable policies has been the normal scenario in many other 
economies that have relied heavily on oil exports.10   
 
Looking ahead, Norwegian fiscal policy could become a lot more expan-
sionary for many years without even turning the government budget into a 
deficit.  And even if fiscal deficits should reappear, there is a long way to go 
                                                     
10 An extreme example is Venezuela that used to have a share of oil exports in total 
exports of 90% and a share of oil revenue in the government’s total revenue of 60%. 
The high oil price in the beginning of the 1980s triggered an ambitious fiscal spend-
ing program that led to debt and currency crises when the oil price plunged in 1986. 
During the turbulent 1980s, Venezuela’s GDP per capita declined by 18%, see 
Hausmann (1999).  
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until the net asset position of the government turns into net debt.  The in-
creasing wealth of the government has increased the demands and political 
pressure from various interest groups to cut taxes and increase government 
employment and spending, a pressure that is hardly possible to ignore for 
Norwegian governments that usually are weak and not even backed by a sta-
ble majority in parliament.  If fiscal policy turns much more expansionary 
than the present fiscal stance, monetary policy could come under great pres-
sure.  In particular, the new rule for fiscal policy from 2001 indeed implies 
that fiscal policy will become more expansionary in the future, which is 
likely to lead to a sizeable real appreciation of the krone.  In fact, this real 
appreciation, or part of it, may already have occurred.  
 
In what follows we discuss the impact of fiscal policy and the phase-in of oil 
revenues implied by the new guidelines for fiscal policy.  We first take a 
closer look at the new economic policy framework that was established in 
April 2001, involving an inflation target of 2.5% and a new fiscal-policy 
rule.  Then we discuss the impact of this for monetary policy and the real 
exchange rate.  
 
4.2  The new economic-policy framework 
 
The “Solidarity Alternative” 
During the last couple of years, the macroeconomic policy framework in 
Norway has changed.  The former framework (the "Solidarity Alternative") 
was established in the aftermath of the 1988-89 recession and the subsequent 
poor employment performance in the beginning of the 1990s.  The main goal 
of that framework was to restore full employment with low inflation, by a 
combination of central wage coordination (the income policy cooperation 
with the organizations of the labor market) and active counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy.11  Monetary policy should aim at a stable exchange rate against the 
ecu/euro as a nominal anchor.  After the speculative attack by the end of 
1992, the exchange rate was no longer complete fixed, however, but allowed 
to fluctuate around, at first, an unspecified target level and, from May 1994, 
a specified level in terms of ecu and later euro.  This monetary-policy regime 
can be described as a managed float.  No explicit target band for the ex-
change rate was announced.  Norges Bank stabilized the krone around its 
unspecified target value by increasing or decreasing the interest rate if the 
krone was considered too weak or strong, respectively, and in this way kept 
                                                     
11 The name “Solidarity Alternative” refers to the solidarity (in centralized wage 
settlements) expected of insiders in the labour market towards unemployed outsid-
ers.   
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it not too far from what it used to be in 1993.  Fiscal policy was assigned the 
sole responsibility for macroeconomic stabilization through active aggregate 
demand management.  For this purpose, a budget-balance indicator was con-
structed that excludes net government income from the petroleum sector and 
is adjusted for cyclical components and some other transitory items.   
 
During the recovery from the slowdown of the Norwegian economy in the 
beginning of the 1990s, this framework served its purpose well.  During the 
1996-1997 boom, however, weaknesses became apparent.  The krone tended 
to appreciate in the boom, and to prevent this, Norges Bank had to reduce its 
instrument rate.  Thus, by reducing the interest rate in boom, monetary pol-
icy became pro-cyclical and further fueled the boom.  This placed a large 
burden on fiscal policy:  It was supposed to counteract not only the original 
overheating of the economy but also the expansionary effect of monetary 
policy.  Table 4.1 presents two fiscal policy indicators for the period 1995-
2001.  From the first column we see that taxes paid by the mainland econ-
omy (excluding taxes on petroleum and shipping) did indeed increase faster 
than mainland GDP from 1995 to 1997.  Moreover, government spending in 
% of mainland GDP declined substantially during the same period.  As a 
result, total spending minus mainland taxes declined from 9.8% to 5.7% of 
mainland GDP in 1997.  Therefore, it is very likely that fiscal policy did 
have a counter-cyclical effect during the boom.  But it was not sufficient to 
prevent a very tight labor market, strong wage growth and inflationary pres-
sure.  
 
For the minority government at the time, it was hardly politically possible to 
tighten fiscal policy sufficiently under the prevailing circumstances.  Even if 
a stable majority in parliament had supported the government, it is doubtful 
whether a sufficient tightening of fiscal policy would have been feasible 
without some backing from monetary policy.   
 
Table 4.1.  Mainland taxes and total government spending, 1995-2001 
(% of mainland GDP). 
Year Mainland taxes (%) Total government 
spending (%) 
Spending less 
mainland taxes (%) 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
46.3 
47.4 
48.2 
47.7 
49.0 
49.4 
- 
56.1 
55.5 
53.9 
53.7 
54.9 
55.1 
55.6 
9.8 
8.1 
5.7 
6.0 
5.9 
5.7 
- 
Source:  National Budget 2002. 
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Implicit inflation targeting 
Thus, fiscal policy was not sufficiently contractionary, monetary policy with 
a fixed exchange rate was effectively pro-cyclical, and the boom continued 
to build up and increase tensions in the economy.  From 1999, the new gov-
ernor of Norges Bank, Svein Gjedrem, innovatively reinterpreted the fixed-
exchange rate instruction from the government as implying a long-run ex-
change-rate target, and furthermore stated that the best way to achieve the 
long-run exchange rate target was to aim at inflation at a level similar to that 
in the Euro zone.  This did away with the procyclical tendency of a fixed 
exchange rate and allowed monetary policy to contribute to stabilizing the 
business cycle.  
 
This dramatic change in monetary policy to a superior monetary-policy re-
gime was nevertheless not presented as a basic change of the monetary-
policy framework, but as a way of improving the performance of monetary 
policy in the context of the Solidarity Alternative.  Still, there can be no 
doubt that the markets fairly soon realized that Norges Bank had in effect 
adopted an inflation target of about 2%, and that the previous exchange-rate 
target had been abandoned. 
 
New guidelines for economic policy  
In 2000, a new challenge to the Solidarity Alternative emerged:  A dramatic 
increase in the government's petroleum income triggered by the oil price in-
crease.  In table 4.2 we see that the government's petroleum revenue (net 
cash flow from the petroleum sector) increased from 4.5% of mainland GDP 
in 1999 to 15.3% in 2000 and to 22% in 2001.12  The surplus of the central 
government increased even more, from 4% of mainland GDP in 1999 to 15.6 
in 2000 and to the astonishing 23.4% of mainland GDP in 2001.  Likewise, 
the surplus on Norway’s current account increased from 6.4% in 1999 to 
about 20% of mainland GDP in 2000 and 2001.  The surpluses implied a 
rapid growth of the Government Petroleum Fund from 22.1% of mainland 
GDP by the end of 1999 to 55.9% two years later.  Also for the medium term 
future, large current account surpluses are expected.  Although Norwegians 
have grown accustomed to such numbers, for international observers they 
are simply amazing. 
 
The government's own estimates in 2000 and 2001 indicated that actual out-
put exceeded potential output somewhat, reflecting a fairly tight labor mar-
                                                     
12 In 2001, the share of mainland GDP in total GDP was 75%. 
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ket.  The economic-policy framework therefore called for a relatively tight 
fiscal policy for 2001.  According to the cyclically adjusted non-oil budget-
balance indicator mentioned above, next to nothing of the extra oil revenues 
to the government could be used to cut taxes or increase spending.  This 
situation exposed another weakness of the old economic-policy framework:  
It was not designed to handle a situation of full employment and large oil 
revenues.  In such a situation, fiscal policy would become overloaded be-
cause the short-run goal of counter-cyclical demand management (based on 
the adjusted budget indicator) would be inconsistent with the goal of phasing 
in oil revenues and returns from the Government Petroleum Fund.  If fiscal 
policy should bear the main burden of stabilizing the output gap in the short 
run, it could not at the same time be used to phase in oil revenues optimally.  
Norway could risk over-accumulating government and national wealth! It 
became clear that fiscal policy could not bear the sole responsibility for sta-
bilizing the output gap.  Monetary policy had to be given a more important 
stabilization role than what the old policy framework had assigned to it.  
This dilemma for Norwegian economic policy explains why the government 
changed the economic policy framework in March 2001. 
 
Table 4.2.  Petroleum revenue, central government surplus, current account surplus, 
and the Petroleum Fund, 1999-2001 (% of mainland GDP) 
 
 1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
Net cash flow from petroleum 
activities to the government (%) 
 
Central government surplus, 
incl. the Petroleum Fund (%) 
 
Current account surplus (%) 
 
Capital in the Government Pe-
troleum Fund (end of year) (%) 
 
4.5 
 
 
4.0 
 
6.4 
 
22.1 
 
15.3 
 
 
15.6 
 
19.9 
 
36.7 
 
22.0 
 
 
23.4 
 
20.3 
 
55.9 
Source:  Revised national budget 2002 and Statistics Norway. 
 
The new guidelines for economic policy presented by the (minority) labor 
government to the Parliament in the Stortingsmelding No. 29, March 2001, 
involved two major changes in the economic policy framework: 
 
(1) Fiscal policy should facilitate a cautious and gradual phase-in of oil 
revenues accumulated in the Government Petroleum Fund, based on a 
new fiscal-policy rule.  According to this rule, under normal business-
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cycle conditions, the phase-in of oil revenues in terms of tax cuts and 
spending increases should correspond to the expected annual real return 
from the Petroleum Fund estimated at 4%.  In addition, however, “em-
phasis must still be given to stabilize economic fluctuations.” 
 
(2) As discussed in section 3.3 above, monetary policy should be oriented 
towards low and stable inflation, with an inflation target of 2.5%.  At the 
same time, monetary policy should “support fiscal policy by contributing 
to stabilizing output and employment.” 
 
Confusingly, as discussed in section 3.3, the guidelines for monetary policy 
also stated that monetary policy should stabilize both inflation and the ex-
change rate, as well as contribute to stable expectations about future ex-
change rates.  Furthermore, “[t]he new guidelines for monetary policy, to-
gether with the [new] guidelines for fiscal policy…, will provide a good ba-
sis for continued stability in the exchange rate, low inflation and a stable de-
velopment of output and employment.” 
 
Indeed, as we have already seen in sections 2 and 3 above, the implied future 
fiscal expansion in the new economic policy means that these three objec-
tives are irreconcilable:  Stability in the exchange rate cannot be reconciled 
with low inflation and a stable output gap. 
 
The government also stressed its commitment to continue the incomes-
policy cooperation with the labor market organizations.  In fact, the Stort-
ingsmelding presents the new policy framework as a way of attaining the 
goals of the Solidarity Alternative:  Work for all, a stable development of 
production and employment, low inflation, a stable exchange rate, and a 
strong tradable-goods sector (the sector exposed to foreign competition, in 
addition to the large petroleum sector). 
 
The Stortingsmelding also gave a strong signal that fiscal policy was sup-
posed to bear a main responsibility for macroeconomic stabilization.  Mone-
tary policy should only “to some extent” support fiscal policy, and one 
should be careful not to place too much burdens on monetary policy.  Less 
attention was paid to the corresponding problem of overloading fiscal policy 
with short-term demand management tasks in booms, when fiscal policy 
should also phase in petroleum revenues in a gradual manner.  As explained 
in more detail in the next section, this probably puts unrealistically high de-
mands on fiscal policy.  
 
A large majority in the Parliament supported the labor minority govern-
ment’s new guidelines for economic policy presented in the Stortingsmeld-
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ing.  In the fall of 2001, a new centre-right minority government came to 
power.  It immediately announced its commitment to follow the new guide-
lines of economic policy stated by the previous government.  It is notewor-
thy, however, that the new government signaled a change in the role of 
monetary and fiscal policy:  Monetary policy should play a more important 
stabilization role, and the main focus of fiscal policy should be long-run 
goals such as increased potential output and a limit on the rate of growth of 
public spending.  This assignment of responsibilities between monetary and 
fiscal policy is similar to the practice in most other inflation targeting coun-
tries. 
 
The importance of a credible fiscal-policy rule 
The new guidelines for fiscal policy have been in operation for a little more 
than a year, and it is too early to say how fiscal policy will work.  Although a 
large majority in Parliament backs the main element of the fiscal-policy rule, 
it could come under pressure and be changed in the future.  It is outside the 
scope of this report to evaluate the fiscal policy rule itself.  We wish to em-
phasize, however, that Norway’s situation makes it particularly important 
that there is a commitment to credible rule for fiscal policy that prevents op-
portunistic overbidding behavior among competing political parties and a 
loss of fiscal discipline.  Without a fiscal rule that provides strong incentives 
for fiscal discipline, the Norwegian economy runs a large risk of decline and 
instability under the burden of an excessive and inefficient public sector, as 
well as insufficient investment and productivity in the private sector.  Exces-
sive fiscal expansion would create dangerously high tensions in Norway and 
make monetary policy extremely difficult.  Most likely, the future fiscal ex-
pansion already implied by the fiscal-policy rule represents a considerable 
challenge to Norges Bank.  
 
The limits of discretionary fiscal policy 
As noted above, the stabilization role of fiscal policy is an unresolved issue 
in Norway.  There are well-known severe problems associated with any dis-
cretionary use of fiscal policy for stabilizing the business cycle.  First, there 
are numerous lags that almost always make fiscal-policy packages arrive too 
late.  There are lags due to the collection of data and the inherent uncertainty 
in identifying the phase of the business cycle.  There are lags in formulating 
the appropriate fiscal-policy response, and there are lags in the passing of 
fiscal-policy packages in Parliament, in particular for a weak government.  
Once a bill has passed, there are also lags in the implementation of expendi-
ture adjustments or tax changes.  As a result, it is quite common that fiscal 
stimulus arrives when the recession is over and a boom has started, and vice 
versa.  Thus, discretionary fiscal policy easily becomes procyclical and de-
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stabilizing.  Second, it is very likely that a focus on short-term stabilization 
goals will reduce the effectiveness of fiscal policy in attaining long-term 
goals.  In most countries, it is politically much easier to obtain a majority 
vote for cutting taxes and increasing spending in business cycle downturns 
than to agree on spending cuts and tax hikes in booms.  Therefore, there is 
easily an expansionary bias in discretionary fiscal policy, leading to a higher 
real interest rate, a stronger currency and lower aggregate saving and in-
vestment.  This line of argument seems to fit the experience in many OECD 
countries in the 1960s and 1970s.  Third, discretionary fiscal policy involves 
welfare costs.  Tax rates become less predictable, the quality and availability 
of public services will fluctuate with the business cycle, and the disruption of 
large public investment projects will be costly. 
 
Policy-coordination failure is another potentially serious problem with active 
fiscal policy.  There could be different opinions about the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment and the current output gap between the government and the 
central bank.  Suppose, for example, that the central bank believes that the 
current output gap is positive (that is, there is excess aggregate demand) 
while the government believe that the output gap is zero.  If fiscal policy is 
assigned a main responsibility for short-run stabilization, a coordination 
problem could arise.  If the central bank tightens monetary policy in order to 
prevent increasing inflation, the government could think that fiscal loosening 
is appropriate.  But then the central bank could react to undo the effects of 
the fiscal policy, and so on.  This process would lead to a very unfortunate 
policy mix:  Too expansionary fiscal policy and a very tight monetary pol-
icy.   
 
In general, good coordination of monetary and fiscal policy can be achieved 
by placing each within a decision framework focusing each on medium-term 
objectives and making those objectives and related actions transparent.  In 
this way, fiscal actions can take full account of the likely monetary-policy 
response, and vice versa.  Regular information exchange between fiscal and 
monetary authorities will also contribute to this.  The alternative approach to 
coordination, namely to make fiscal and monetary-policy decisions jointly, is 
fraught with difficulties and is not feasible, given the operational independ-
ence of the central bank that both in practice and in theory is necessary for 
good monetary policy. 
 
For these reasons, many countries have gradually scaled back discretionary 
fiscal policy, given more long-term goals to fiscal policy, and let any stabili-
zation by fiscal policy be done by the automatic stabilizers that are built into 
today’s welfare states, like unemployment benefits and income transfers.  
For an ambitious welfare state like Norway, the stabilizing effects of the 
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automatic stabilizers are likely to be substantial.  Furthermore, as discussed 
in section 2, a monetary policy characterized by flexible inflation targeting is 
well designed to stabilize the real economy to some extent.  
 
Lessons for Norwegian economic policy and challenges for monetary 
policy 
As far as we can see, the original guidelines for fiscal policy are too optimis-
tic about the role of fiscal policy in stabilizing the economy.  The new gov-
ernment’s emphasis on more long-term goals for fiscal policy and reliance 
on automatic stabilizers rather than discretionary stabilization are therefore 
welcome.  It remains, however, to see whether this government and the 
Norwegian political system in general can succeed in limiting the discretion-
ary element of fiscal policy. 
 
Regarding the long-term goals of fiscal policy and the new fiscal-policy rule, 
the phase-in of the oil revenues implies a substantial future fiscal expansion.  
Furthermore, there is a sizeable risk that discretionary temptations may result 
in much more fiscal expansion than the rule is supposed to allow.  
 
As discussed in section 2.4, a permanent future fiscal expansion is likely to 
lead to a long-term real appreciation of the krone, an even larger short- and 
medium-term real appreciation, and an increase in the neutral real interest 
rate.  Furthermore, these adjustments are equilibrium adjustment to the un-
derlying change in long-term fiscal policy.  As we emphasized in section 2.4, 
this adjustment cannot be prevented by monetary policy.  At most, the ad-
justment can be delayed somewhat, but delaying the adjustment comes with 
substantial costs in the form of higher variability of inflation and the output 
gap and is therefore not advisable.   
 
The confusing and mistaken rhetoric about exchange-rate stability in the new 
guidelines for economic policy seems designed to mislead the Norwegian 
general public about the economic realities that the new fiscal policy im-
plies.  It induces the misunderstanding that the new fiscal policy is consistent 
with exchange-rate stability.  Norges Bank faces a stiff challenge in imple-
menting its monetary policy in the current situation of a boom and real ap-
preciation of the krone.  This challenge is made much more difficult, if there 
is a misunderstanding among the Norwegian public, and perhaps even in the 
Norwegian government, about the economic realities that Norway faces.  In 
the rest of this report, we shall examine how Norges Bank handles these 
challenges. 
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5  How Norges Bank conducts monetary policy 
 
 
5.1  The current best international practice in inflation targeting 
 
As discussed above in section 2, changes in the central bank's instrument 
rate affect inflation and output with a lag, usually about one year for output 
and about two years for inflation.  Monetary policy that aims at controlling 
inflation is therefore best conducted in a forward-looking manner.  In princi-
ple, this is done by constructing conditional forecasts (projections) of future 
inflation, conditional on the available information about the current state of 
the economy, the central bank's view of the transmission mechanism, and 
alternative levels or paths of the central bank's instrument rate (in Norway, 
Norges Bank’s overnight deposit rate).  The current instrument rate is then 
set so that the corresponding inflation projection is consistent with the infla-
tion target at an appropriate horizon, usually about two years ahead.  
 
Judging whether the inflation projection is consistent with the inflation target 
requires that the interpretation of the inflation target is clear.  As discussed 
above, inflation-targeting central banks interpret their inflation targets as 
flexible medium-term point targets, aiming at achieving their inflation tar-
gets in the medium term, but also putting some weight on stabilizing the 
output gap.   
 
In principle, flexible inflation targeting can be implemented by making pro-
jections of both inflation and the output gap and then choosing an instrument 
rate (or a planned instrument rate path) that results in a good compromise 
between the speed with which the inflation projection approaches the infla-
tion target and the projected output-gap movements required for this.  Some 
analysis (see, for instance, Batini and Haldane (1999) and Svensson (1999)) 
has pointed out that, in many circumstance, a close to equivalent way of in-
corporating flexible inflation targeting is by aiming at the inflation target at a 
longer horizon.  This normally implies conducting policy in a more gradual 
and measured way, for instance, accepting short-run (“first-round”) devia-
tions of inflation from the target after a shock, and this way avoiding desta-
bilizing output.  While not perfectly equivalent, this approach is the one 
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adopted by inflation-targeting central banks to date, including Norges 
Bank.13  
 
Which central banks in the rest of the world represent the best international 
practice in inflation targeting? In our view, in Europe, the Bank of England 
and the Riksbank are obvious candidates.  By now, both central banks have 
accumulated considerable experience in inflation targeting.  They have de-
veloped efficient procedures for information collection, analysis and deci-
sion-making.  They are both very transparent and thus open to scrutiny and 
evaluation.  They have explicitly committed themselves to flexible rather 
than strict inflation targeting.  They have excellent Inflation Reports with 
published forecasts and have provided regular innovations with regard to 
both techniques and transparency.  Both banks publish the minutes and votes 
of their decision-making bodies (the MPC for the Bank of England, the Ex-
ecutive Board for the Riksbank).  Those minutes reveal that the analysis and 
discussion before the decisions are sophisticated and of very high quality.  
Most or all members of their decision-making bodies are experts in monetary 
policy, macroeconomics or financial markets.14  
 
Beyond Europe, in line with the conclusion in Svensson (2001), we also 
consider the Reserve Bank of New Zealand as providing an example of best 
international practice in inflation targeting.  The Bank of Canada and the 
Reserve Bank of Australia may also seem to be natural candidates.  There is 
no reason to doubt the competence, judgment and accumulated experience of 
these banks.  However, they have so far chosen to be less transparent than 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England and the Riksbank.  
They have less informative and detailed reports and motivations of their pol-
icy, and they do not publish minutes of their policy discussions.  Thus, non-
public inside information would be required for a more thorough assessment 
of the quality of their policy-making.15 
 
                                                     
13 For an example of the practical handling of these issues, see the clarification of 
the Executive Board of the Riksbank in Sveriges Riksbank (1999), as well as the 
discussion in Heikensten and Vredin (1998). 
14 The Bank of England and the Riksbank also seem to have been models for the 
inflation-targeting frameworks set up by the Czech National Bank in the transition 
economy of the Czech Republic and Banco Central do Brasil in the developing 
economy of Brazil. 
15 The Reserve Bank of Australia is however similar to Norges Bank in that mone-
tary-policy decisions are made by an Executive Board with several members who 
are nonexperts in monetary policy and related issues.  
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The Federal Reserve System in the US or the Eurosystem in Europe are not 
suitable for comparison, since they operate in very large economies and 
hence under very different circumstances.  Furthermore, the Federal Reserve 
System is hardly an example of the current best practice in inflation target-
ing.  Although the actual policy has been quite successful, the monetary-
policy framework lacks a clear objective and suffers from insufficient trans-
parency.16   
 
Neither is the Eurosystem (consisting of the European Central Bank and the 
12 national central banks in the EMU) an example of the current best prac-
tice in inflation targeting.  It has been severely criticized for an ambiguous 
and asymmetric formulation of its inflation target, an inconsistent and con-
fusing two-pillar monetary-policy strategy, and insufficient transparency by 
a number of external observers.17    
 
Thus, we find that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England 
and the Riksbank are suitable for comparison with Norges Bank as examples 
of the current best international practice of inflation targeting, also since they 
operate in open and  not too large economies.  
 
5.2  Evaluating inflation targeting 
 
As noted above in section 3.3, the Regulation for Monetary Policy of March 
2001 specifies that monetary policy “shall be oriented towards low and sta-
ble inflation,” and that “the operational target of monetary policy shall be 
annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time.” 
Furthermore, “[a]t the same time, monetary policy shall underpin fiscal pol-
icy by contributing to stable developments in output and employment.”  As 
discussed above, it makes sense to interpret the last sentence as referring to 
stability of the output gap, the difference between output and potential out-
                                                     
16 The guiding legislation (the Federal Reserve Bank Act) arguably lists contradic-
tory goals for the Federal Reserve System, and any move towards a more consistent 
law about the goals of monetary policy seems stalled. Members of the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) are sometimes reported to have different objectives and 
different perceived models of the economy. Published monetary policy statements 
are not of the same quality and transparency as those of the inflation-targeting cen-
tral banks. Several informed observers have suggested that the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem should move to an explicit inflation-targeting regime (Bernanke, Laubach, 
Mishkin and Posen (1998), Bernanke, Laubach and Posen (2000) and Cecchetti 
(2000). 
17 See, for example, Gros, Blanchard, Emerson, Mayer, Sinn, St. Paul and Tabellini 
(1998), Favero, Freixas, Persson and Wyplosz (2000) and Svensson (2000). 
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put (which in most cases would be highly correlated with the difference be-
tween employment and “potential” employment).  In addition, “[i]n general, 
the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, 
taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be 
taken into account.”   
 
This regulation thus specifies flexible inflation targeting, with a 2.5% infla-
tion target for a modified consumer price index (CPI) that excludes some 
direct effects on the CPI.  Norges Bank used a CPI adjusted for changes in 
taxes and energy prices, denoted by the acronym CPIATE.  
 
One way to evaluate the performance of Norges Bank would be to examine 
whether actual CPIATE inflation has stayed close to the inflation target and 
whether monetary policy has contributed to stable developments in the out-
put gap.  There are two problems with such an approach.  The first, tempo-
rary, problem is that the new guidelines for monetary policy only started to 
apply in March 2001.  Above we have emphasized the lags between instru-
ment adjustment and effect on output and inflation, perhaps a year for output 
and up to another year for inflation.  Thus, the decisions Norges Bank have 
made in the first year after the introduction of the new guidelines have not 
yet had their full impact on output, much less on inflation.  We need at least 
another year or two of data to include the period during which the first year’s 
decisions have had their impact on output and inflation, and several years of 
data to be able to assess some average performance.  The second, more fun-
damental, problem is that monetary policy is conducted under consider-
able—sometimes close to overwhelming—uncertainty, given difficulties in 
interpreting incoming information, assessing the state of the economy and 
uncertainty about the lags and effects of monetary-policy actions on the fu-
ture development of the economy.  Also, during the lags between instrument 
adjustment and impact on output and inflation, unanticipated shocks and dis-
turbances intervene, so the observations of actual output and inflation are 
contaminated by these shocks.  Furthermore, potential output, the reference 
point for output used to construct the output gap, is notoriously difficult to 
estimate.  Thus, ex post evaluation of monetary policy is not as easy to do as 
one might first think, even if several years of data is available, and unless 
adjustment for unanticipated shocks is done, it may be quite misleading.  In 
general, with the benefit of hindsight, monetary policy could in most cases 
have been better.  This is not surprising.  The real issue, however, is whether 
there were any serious mistakes, given available information at the time of 
decision. 
 
Thus, because of these two problems, evaluation of monetary policy during 
the first year of the new guidelines must be ex ante.  Given the available in-
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formation about the state of the economy and the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy at the time of decisions, did Norges Bank make the right 
decisions?  As discussed above, best-international-practice inflation-
targeting central banks like the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of 
England and the Riksbank in practice implement inflation targeting by set-
ting interest rates such that the corresponding inflation forecast is consistent 
with the inflation target at a reasonable horizon, usually about two years.  
This is also the way Norges Bank implements inflation targeting.   
 
Then, the projections provide the way to evaluate policy.  A first question is, 
are the forecasts Norges Bank uses in its implementation reasonably good 
and unbiased?  A second question is, given the projections, in particular the 
inflation projections, did Norges Bank make the right decisions? 
 
Concerning the first question, we have not been able to independently exam-
ine the quality of Norges Bank’s forecasts.  Sturød (2002) evaluates Norges 
Bank’s forecasts for 2000 for a number of macro variables and compares 
them with those of a few other forecasters, namely the OECD, Consensus 
Economics, the IMF and the Ministry of Finance.  Norges Bank has the best 
forecast of inflation and does not have the worst forecast for GDP.  A more 
extensive study over a longer sample is necessary for a precise conclusion, 
but we nevertheless proceed under the assumption that Norges Bank’s fore-
casts are as good as other forecasters’ and in that sense reasonably good and 
unbiased. 
 
This leaves the second question, whether, given the projections, Norges 
Bank made the right decisions.   
 
5.3  The big picture 
 
Above, we have outlined the challenges Norges Bank faces.  In evaluating 
the performance of Norges Bank, we start with the big picture.  By this we 
mean whether the Bank has an appropriate decision process for monetary 
policy, whether its analysis is of sufficient quality, and whether the Bank has 
the major insights that make it likely that individual decisions are right.  
 
The decision process of monetary policy18 
The Executive Board makes the decisions about the instrument rate.  The 
Bank has developed an elaborate decision process, where large amounts of 
                                                     
18 Gjedrem (2001b) provides more details on the decision process for monetary pol-
icy. 
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data and information are collected, processed and analyzed in a regular deci-
sion cycle.  The analysis is summarized in the Bank’s Inflation Report, 
which is published three times a year.19  The Inflation Report presents an in-
depth analysis of the state of the Norwegian economy and the outlook for 
inflation.  The Inflation Report is published, together with a decision about 
the instrument rate, immediately after a monetary-policy meeting with the 
Executive Board.20    
 
The Executive Board discusses the economic outlook at a separate meeting, 
the so-called strategy meeting, three weeks before the Inflation Report is 
published.  On the basis of preliminary projections and analysis, the Execu-
tive Board assesses the outlook for inflation some two years ahead, as well 
as the uncertainty surrounding the projections.  The next day, the Executive 
Board summarizes its discussions and assesses the consequences for mone-
tary policy for the next four months.  This assessment, contained in the 
Strategeginotat (Note on Strategy), constitutes an important internal refer-
ence point when the Executive Board later makes a decision regarding the 
interest rate.  It will also provide a basis for the Bank’s externally oriented 
communication through speeches and the media.   
 
Two members of Norges Bank Watch (Steigum and Svensson) have had the 
opportunity to examine the Strateginotat of the strategy meetings before the 
Inflation Reports of October 2001 and February 2002.  They provide analy-
sis of very good quality, in content similar to the Inflation Report.  They go 
further than the Inflation Report, for instance, in discussing consequences of 
alternative instrument-rate paths and in motivation for the particular instru-
ment-rate intervals considered.  The Strateginotat is not published; we be-
lieve a natural further improvement of the transparency of Norwegian mone-
tary policy is that they are published.  Such publication would indeed be 
very much in line with the definition of transparency as "the extent to which 
                                                     
19 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England and the Riksbank pub-
lish Inflation Reports (called Monetary Policy Statements in New Zealand) four 
times a year rather than three.  As noted in Kohn (2000), this quarterly frequency 
puts a lot of stress on the staff.  It may very well be that new relevant information 
for monetary policy normally arrives at such a modest rate that major decisions 
every four months are sufficient.    
20 The Bank has invited Hans Genberg and Charles Wyplosz, Graduate Institute for 
International Studies, Geneva, to evaluate the Inflation Report.  The purpose of the 
evaluation is to assess (1) how suitable the Inflation Report is as a basis for mone-
tary policy, compared to Inflation Reports in other countries and (2) how good the 
report is in communicate monetary policy externally, to journalists, the market and 
other agents. 
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the external presentation of the decisions corresponds to the internal deci-
sion-making process" due to Duisenberg (2000), which definition is approv-
ingly quoted by Gjedrem (2001a, 2002) and Bergo (2002). 
 
The Executive Board uses a simple rule in its interest-rate decision 
(Gjedrem, 2001b): 
 
“If it appears that inflation will be higher than 2½ per cent with un-
changed interest rates, the interest rate will be increased.  If it ap-
pears that inflation will be lower than 2½ per cent with unchanged 
interest rates, the interest rate will be reduced.  
 
… Analyses performed by Norges Bank indicate that a substantial 
share of the effects on inflation occur within two years.  Two years 
is therefore a reasonable time horizon for achieving the inflation tar-
get of 2½ per cent.  Therefore, the inflation outlook in two years 
may be viewed as an intermediate target for monetary policy.” 
 
Between the publications of the Inflation Reports, the Executive Board 
meets for in-depth monetary-policy discussions every six weeks, at pre-
announced dates.  Then the Board assesses developments in a number of 
different economic indicators, with special emphasis on substantial devia-
tions from the assessments in the last Inflation Report.  Normally, any deci-
sions regarding changes in interest rates are taken at these meetings.  The 
Executive Board’s decision is published in a press release immediately after 
monetary-policy meetings.  After each monetary-policy meeting, a press 
conference is held at which the Bank’s assessments are summarized and the 
Executive Board’s decision is presented. 
 
The Bank’s analysis and decisions are communicated in an efficient and 
transparent way, via the Inflation Reports, press releases and the introduction 
to press conferences after the Board’s monetary-policy meetings.  These are 
all available on the Bank’s well-organized website.    
 
As far as we can see, Norges Bank’s decision process and external commu-
nication is very appropriate and comparable to best international practice.  
As we shall see, this does not prevent us from recommending a few potential 
further improvements of the decision process and the Bank’s analysis and 
projections.   
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Summary assessment of the big picture 
Thus, when it comes to the big picture, we believe we have a firm conclu-
sion.  Norwegian monetary policy is in very good hands.  The Bank has a 
very competent and highly trained top management and staff.  The top man-
agement and many in the staff has long experience of economic policy, both 
monetary and fiscal.  The Bank has a long tradition of research and analysis 
on an academic level.  Although the Bank has a short experience of inflation 
targeting, for several years before inflation targeting was introduced, it or-
ganized conferences and meetings on monetary policy, including inflation 
targeting, with academic researchers and central bank officials from many 
countries, and this way building up understanding of and competence in in-
flation targeting.  We believe the Bank’s Inflation Report, the Strateginotat, 
the speeches by Bank officials and articles and working papers published by 
the Bank clearly demonstrate the high quality of the Bank’s analysis and un-
derstanding.  The Bank gives the impression of being a very competent and 
enthusiastic newcomer to the inflation-targeting camp, and it is our firm 
view that it masters the insights required for successful inflation targeting.  
Again, this praise will not deter us from proposing a number of potential im-
provements, which in several cases would push the frontier of best interna-
tional practice in inflation targeting further out. 
 
 
5.4  Brief evaluation of decisions  
 
Figure 5.1 shows inflation of CPIATE for 2001-2002 and the inflation pro-
jections from the last four Inflation Reports, of June and October in 2001 
and February and June of 2002.  Figure 5.2 shows the Bank’s instrument 
rate, the overnight deposit rate, for 1999-2001. 
 
After the current monetary-policy regime was introduced in March, 2001, 
Norges Bank kept the instrument rate at 7% until December 12, 2001, when 
it reduced the rate to 6.5%.  On July 3, 2002, the Bank increased the rate 
back to 7%. 
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Figure 5.1.  Inflation and inflation projections (%/yr) 
Source:  Statistics Norway and Norges Bank. 
 
Figure 5.2.  The instrument rate (the sight deposit rate, %) 
 
Source:  Norges Bank. 
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First we shall discuss some general aspects of how Norges Bank uses projec-
tions; then we shall discuss some individual decisions. 
 
The assumptions of constant interest rates and exchange rates 
The projections Norges Bank uses and reports in the Inflation Report are 
constructed under some specific assumptions.  The appendix to the Inflation 
Report includes a table with the assumptions made about the most crucial 
variables.  The standard assumptions about the instrument rate and the ex-
change rate are that they are constant.  This is problematic.  First, a constant 
exchange rate is usually not consistent with a constant interest rate and theo-
retical relations like uncovered interest-rate parity.  Neither is a constant ex-
change rate usually consistent with market expectations of future exchange 
rates.  Fortunately, the Inflation Report also includes some discussion of the 
consequences of alternative exchange-rate assumptions.  Second, a constant 
interest rate is usually not consistent with the best future monetary policy, 
the likely future policy, or market expectations.  This means that the assump-
tion of constant instrument rates builds in a number of inconsistencies in the 
resulting projections, which adds a certain degree of arbitrariness to these 
projections.21  Furthermore, since the assumption of a constant interest rate is 
usually not the best forecast of future instrument rates, the resulting projec-
tions of inflation, output and other variables are not the best forecasts of fu-
ture outcomes.  Thus, it makes less sense to compare actual outcomes to 
constant-instrument-rate forecasts, something that any serious evaluation of 
forecasts has to take into account. 
 
One argument in defense of constant-interest-rate projections is that they 
show what would happen if the instrument rate is held constant and therefore 
often provide a good motivation why it should be moved in a particular di-
rection.  On the other hand, this does not say how much the instrument rate 
should be moved, and how soon.  There is often a choice between a smaller 
adjustment sooner and a larger adjustment later.  Which is best?  Another 
argument is that a monetary-policy committee would have difficulties agree-
ing on something else, like a time-varying path for the instrument rate.  This 
argument is not convincing to us, since a monetary-policy committee is 
agreeing on a number of other time-varying paths, like the inflation and out-
put projections, for instance.  A third argument is that, if a time-varying in-
strument path were announced in the Inflation Report, market participants 
and other agents would be confused and interpret this as a firm commitment 
                                                     
21 Leitemo (1999, 2001) discusses some of the problems with constant-interest-rate 
forecasts.  
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of future instrument-rate setting.  This argument seems defeated by the fact 
that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand for a number of years has published 
both a time-varying instrument-rate path and inflation and output-gap projec-
tions conditional on a time-varying instrument path, without any apparent 
misunderstanding by market participants and other agents.  Indeed, Norwe-
gian market participants and other agents are already used to see inflation 
projections and seem fully able to understand that these are contingent about 
available information and the state of the economy, and that they will shift 
when new relevant information arrives.  What is the difference between the 
appropriate instrument-rate path and the inflation projection shifting when 
new information arrives and the state of the economy changes? 
 
For these reasons, it seems to us that Norges Bank should further develop its 
inflation projections so as to make these conditional on time-varying instru-
ment rate paths.  Furthermore, the monetary-policy decisions of the Bank 
should aim at finding a good or even optimal future time-varying instrument-
rate path.  To some extent, some of that work is already done in the Strategi-
notat that the Board uses as guides between the major four-monthly decision 
points.  It is just a matter of developing the process a bit further. 
 
The best situation would seem to be if Norges Bank at each major decision 
point determined what its best instrument-rate plan and corresponding infla-
tion and output-gap projections are.  These projections would then become 
the Bank’s best forecasts of these variables and be the natural ones to publish 
in the Inflation Report.  Publishing these best forecasts would seem to have 
the most effective impact on private-sector expectations and the economy, 
and thus be the most effective way to implement policy.   
 
Norges Bank has already in the past presented inflation projections condi-
tional on market expectations of future interest rates and exchange rates, so it 
already knows how to make projections conditional on time-varying paths of 
these variables.   
 
A separate but related point is that, since the Strateginotat contains some 
essential material that does not appear in the Inflation Report, this should be 
published as well, alternatively all essential content of the Strateginotat 
should be added to the Inflation Report.  However, one useful principle 
would be that, with few exceptions, all the material that the Board receives 
before its monetary-policy decision would be published, possibly with a lag 
of a few weeks.  This would adhere to principles of transparency, in particu-
lar the definition due to Duisenberg (2000) mentioned above, but would also, 
by allowing external scrutiny, even further strengthen the incentives for 
submitting to the Board high-level analysis that can stand the light of day.  
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Mean, mode and the balance of risk 
Norges Bank, as Bank of England and the Riksbank, uses the mode projec-
tion (the outcome that the Bank assesses the highest probability to) as their 
central projection.  Thus, whenever the Bank quotes a single number for a 
projection, this number is the mode.  
 
The graphs of the inflation projections in the Inflation Reports display both 
the mode and a fan chart illustrating the Bank’s view of the probability dis-
tribution around the mode.  Figure 5.3 shows an example, from IR 3/01, pub-
lished in October 2001.  As we can see, the mode of the inflation projection 
(the thick dark-blue line) falls below 2.5% until at a horizon of about two 
years, when the mode coincides with 2.5% until then end of the projection, 
at the end of 2003.  The shaded fields of dark to light blue illustrate the 
Bank’s view of the uncertainty about the projection, the probability distribu-
tion for the outcome of inflation, under the stated underlying assumptions for 
the projection.  Thus, 30% of the probability distribution falls within the in-
nermost dark-blue shaded area, 50% falls within that area and the next 
lighter-blue shaded area, etc.  The lightest-blue shaded area (including the 
darker-shaded area) contains 90% of the probability distribution.   
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Figure 5.3.  Chart 3.8 in IR 3/01. 
 
 
 
As we can see in figure 5.3, the blue shades are not symmetric around the 
mode.  More of the probability mass is located below the mode than above.  
This is seen more clearly in figure 5.4 (chart 3.9 in IR 3/01), which shows 
the probability density function for inflation at the end of 2003.  The mode 
corresponds to the maximum probability density and equals, in this case, 
2.5%.  Figure 5.4 shows that 60% of the probability mass falls below the 
mode and that 40% falls above the mode.  Thus, this is a case of an asym-
metric probability distribution.  The probability that the inflation outcome 
will fall below the mode is larger than the probability that it will fall above.   
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Figure 5.4.  Chart 3.9 in IR 3/01. 
 
 
 
Norges Bank takes account of such asymmetries in bias statements like  
 
“according to Norges Bank’s assessment, with an unchanged interest 
rate, the probability that inflation two years ahead will be lower 
(higher) than 2.5% is greater than/is the same as the probability that 
it will be higher (lower)”.   
 
Thus, the bias is up/neutral/down means that the probability that inflation 
two years ahead will be above 2.5% is higher/the same/lower than the prob-
ability that it will be lower than 2.5%.  Furthermore, the Bank tends to adjust 
the instrument rate in the same direction as the bias. 
 
The bias statement is actually a statement about the median projection, since 
the median is the outcome with the same probability above and below the 
outcome.  Thus, the bias is up/neutral/down means that the median inflation 
two-year ahead is above/equal to/below 2.5%.  Consequently, the Bank tends 
to adjust the instrument rate in the opposite direction when the median infla-
tion projection two years ahead deviates from the inflation target.   
 
If this is so, would it not be simpler and more transparent to use the median 
as the central projection?  That is, let the thick blue line in figure 5.3 be the 
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median rather than the mode.  Then the extra formulation about the prob-
abilities is unnecessary, and the fan chart is only used to illustrate the degree 
of uncertainty, not to adjust the forecast from the mean. 
 
However, the theory says that the mean, the probability weighted average, is 
the right central projection.  This is because of so-called certainty equiva-
lence.  That is, if the transmission mechanism is approximately linear and 
the objectives can be expressed as an approximately quadratic loss function, 
optimal monetary policy can be expressed in terms of the mean projections.  
Put differently, once the mean projections have been constructed, the analy-
sis can proceed as if there were no uncertainty about the mean.  The theoreti-
cal result about certainty equivalence is one of the most powerful and impor-
tant results for practical monetary policy.22  
 
Thus, this suggests that Norges Bank should compute the mean projection 
and report that as their central projection.  Then the fan chart can be used to 
illustrate the degree of uncertainty in the projections, but no additional ad-
justment because of asymmetric probability distributions needs to be done.  
This seems a much simpler and more transparent procedure than the current 
reporting of mode forecast and subsequent adjustment when the mean fore-
cast differ from the mode. 
 
Norges Bank is not alone in using mode projections; central banks have a 
tradition to report mode forecasts rather than mean forecasts.  The reason is 
probably that in the construction of informal and judgmental projections, the 
practice of forecasters is often to discuss the most likely outcome first.  The 
fact that projections often are constructed by starting from the mode does 
not, however, imply that they have to be reported as mode forecasts.  Since 
Norges Bank also constructs a probability distribution around the mode, it is 
trivial to construct the mean projection from the probability distribution.  
Thus, the practice to start with mode projection does not imply that one can-
not report the mean projection as the central projection. 
 
Moving from two-year inflation projections to both inflation and out-
put-gap projections 
As discussed, Norges Bank implements flexible inflation targeting by refer-
ring to inflation projections about two years ahead.  As discussed in section 
2, this is an implicit way to achieve a good compromise between inflation 
                                                     
22 Svensson and Woodford (2002) discuss the certainty-equivalence theorem in a 
fairly general situation when there are forward-looking variables and partial infor-
mation about the state of the economy.  
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stability and output-gap stability.  It has become the standard way to imple-
ment flexible inflation targeting among best-international-practice inflation 
targeting central banks.  Still, it is an approximate and implicit way to im-
plement flexible inflation targeting, and theory has shown that it may be 
somewhat more imperfect than was first thought (see, for instance, Leitemo 
(1999, 2001)).  Therefore, we believe that Norges Bank could further de-
velop flexible inflation targeting by constructing and publishing output-gap 
projections parallel to the inflation projections, and then choose a time-
varying instrument-rate path that achieves a good compromise between in-
flation stability and output stability.  This would elevate flexible inflation 
targeting to a new level of sophistication and could mean that Norges Bank 
on this point takes the lead in the world-wide development of inflation tar-
geting.  
 
An explicit weight on output-gap stability 
Another step towards more explicit flexible inflation targeting would be to 
be more explicit about the weight on output-gap stability.  Indeed, as dis-
cussed in section 2, since flexible inflation targeting, implies a delicate 
choice between inflation and output-gap variability, transparency would 
seem to be well served if inflation-targeting central banks became more ex-
plicit about this choice and their preferences between inflation and output 
stability.  Svensson (2002a, b) has argued that central bank’s should come 
out in the open and be explicit about their relative preferences between infla-
tion and output-gap stability by deciding on and announcing the weight they 
put on stability of the output gap relative to stability of inflation.  Norges 
Bank, with its devotion to transparency, could take the lead here and be the 
first to announce this relative weight.  An intermediate step would be to 
make an internal preliminary decision about the relative weight and see to 
what extent that would be useful in policy decisions. 
 
Norges Banks decisions from September 2001 
We also discuss some individual decisions of Norges Bank since the publica-
tion of the last Norges Bank Watch in September 2001.  Naturally, we have 
more to say on the principles for decisions and instrument-rate setting and 
somewhat less to say on the actual interest-rate levels chosen, since we have 
not had the time and resources for a thorough evaluation of each decision. 
 
As noted above, the Board of Norges Bank conducts monetary-policy meet-
ings about every six weeks.  The first meeting after the last Norges Bank 
Watch was published in September 2001 was held on September 19, 2001.  
The potential consequences of the events of September 11 had presented 
central banks all over the world with a new challenge and increased uncer-
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tainty.  In the aftermath of the events of September 11, central banks across 
Europe had conducted cuts in the short-term interest rates.  In contrast, Nor-
ges Bank kept the instrument rate unchanged at 7%.  The press release stated 
that the bias was neutral, that is (cf. discussion above), that the median infla-
tion projection two years ahead was on target.  This was the same statement 
as after the previous monetary-policy meeting on August 8.  Thus, the infla-
tion projection two-years out had not changed after September 11.   
 
The interest-rate decision was somewhat controversial and took the market 
by surprise.  The real uncertainty at this point was about international factors 
and their impact on the Norwegian economy.  
 
The Board stated in its decision (Introduction to the press conference, Sep-
tember 19, 2001): 
 
“The Norwegian economy is characterized by high capacity utilization 
and high cost inflation.  The mainland economy appears to be expand-
ing approximately in line with growth in output potential.  At present, 
we do not have sufficient evidence to assert that international develop-
ments will change this situation as long as oil prices remain high.  
House prices and household borrowing are rising at a rapid pace.  The 
announced increase in spending of petroleum revenues could lead to a 
more expansionary fiscal stance than in recent years.” 
 
Thus, the Bank’s view was that activity and demand remained high and that 
there was not yet sufficient evidence that international developments would 
change this and affect the inflation projections, which would make wait and 
see the appropriate policy.   
 
We have not had the time and resources to scrutinize this view and decision 
in further detail, nor to look more into the issue of how sensitive the Norwe-
gian economy is to international disturbances that affect export demand and 
export prices separately from the effect through oil prices and the exchange 
rate.   
 
In the 10 days after September 11, the oil price dropped from around USD 
28 per barrel to USD 21, while the krone remained basically unchanged (see 
figures 5.5 and 5.6).  Moreover, the Norwegian stock market followed global 
equity markets into nose dive of more than 30 percent.  Clearly, the Bank 
faced a difficult situation.   
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Figure 5.5.  The oil price (Brent blend, $/barrel)  
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From an ex post point of view, the Bank’s decision on September 19 to keep 
the instrument rate unchanged at 7% appears to be the right one.  The reces-
sion feared by many in the days after September 11 did not materialize, per-
haps to a large extent because of the easing of monetary policy by other cen-
tral banks.  
 
The (unpublished) Strateginotat of October 4 (which has been read by 
Steigum and Svensson) and the subsequent Inflation Report of October, 
2001, present, in our view, a competent and cool-headed analysis of this dif-
ficult situation with a focus on medium-term fundamentals.   
 
The mode inflation projection presented in the Inflation Report is shown in 
figure 5.1 (the curve for IR 3/01) and figures 5.3-5.4.  Although, the mode 
projection two-years ahead was on target, the bias was down, as stated in the 
bias statement of October 31.  According to Norges Bank’s simple rule, this 
could have motivated a lowered interest rate already then, even though activ-
ity and demand remained high. 
 
At the next Board meeting, on December 12, the instrument rate was cut by 
0.5 percentage points to 6.5%.  Even with the new interest rate, the bias was 
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still down.  The oil prices had not recovered from the September decline and 
still seemed to be on a downward trend.  
 
The next meeting was held on January 23, 2002.  The Bank kept the instru-
ment rate unchanged, in spite of still stating that the median inflation projec-
tion two years out remained below target.  At this time, the risk of a deep 
recession in the world economy appeared to have diminished.  By early 
March, the oil price was back above USD 20 per barrel.  By then, it seemed 
clear that there would not be an international recession.  At the Board meet-
ing on February 27, the bias statement was changed to neutral.  The Bank 
moved the focus back to domestic issues, where uncertainty about upcoming 
wage negotiations was high.  After the Board meeting on April 10, the Bank 
stated that (Introduction to the press conference): 
 
“Wage negotiations are under way, but at this stage it would be prema-
ture to draw any conclusions about the outcome.” 
 
At the next meeting, held on May 22, the trend in the wage agreements was 
confirmed.  The Board changed the bias to up.  
 
Strong wage growth, faster growth in consumption, a higher oil price and a 
more favourable global economic outlook made the increased tensions in the 
Norwegian economy in the late spring and summer of 2002.  The krone con-
tinued to appreciate, as one would expect, both from the future fiscal expan-
sion implied by the new guidelines for fiscal policy and by the general in-
crease in demand, but, according to the Bank’s statement, not sufficiently to 
counteract these tensions (Introduction to the press conference):   
 
“The effective krone exchange rate is now 4½ per cent stronger than the 
rate assumed in the February Inflation Report. … [T]he appreciation of 
the krone cannot fully counteract stronger wage growth, faster growth 
in consumption, a higher oil price and a somewhat more favorable 
global economic outlook.” 
 
In June and July 2002 the perception of economic developments in the US as 
well as Europe took a negative turn.  Financial markets experienced severe 
turbulence, and stock indices fell, adding to the uncertainty of the situation.  
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Figure 5.6.  Effective NOK exchange rate (Chart 1, p. 8, of IR 2/02) 
 
 
 
On July 3, Norges Bank raised the interest rate 0.5 percentage points to 7%.  
The Inflation Report of July, 2002, still showed an inflation projection con-
ditional on an instrument rate of 6.5%.  The mode projection is shown in 
figure 5.1 (the curve for IR 2/02).  As seen in the figure, the mode projection 
exceeds the target two years ahead, in July 2004.  The bias statement of July 
3 was up.  The statement does not explicitly mention whether this is condi-
tional on a 6.5 or 7% interest rate (a slight transparency slip).  We interpret it 
as conditional on 7%; if so, even after the 0.5 percentage point increase, the 
median projection exceeded the target.  The Inflation Report contains a very 
interesting discussion of the consequences of alternative assumptions about 
both interest rates and exchange rates (including an instrument-path consis-
tent with market expectations of an increased instrument rate).  The Intro-
duction to the press conference provided further details: 
 
“Growth in the Norwegian economy picked up towards the end of 
2001 and into 2002.  Private consumption has shown a substantial rise 
as a result of strong income growth.  Households also expect contin-
ued strong income growth in the period ahead.  Households are still 
borrowing heavily.  Housing investment is high and financial invest-
ment is low.  House prices are rising.  Public expenditure is growing 
as a percentage of GDP.  The level of petroleum investment is ex-
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pected to be high.  Large projects in the aluminum industry are boost-
ing mainland business investment, whereas other investment may be 
low.  There are strong pressures on economic resources.  Wage 
growth is markedly higher than estimated in the February Inflation 
Report.  The results of the various pay settlements point to wage 
growth of between 5½ per cent and 6 per cent this year.  This year’s 
wage settlements resulted in different pay increases for different 
groups … These developments may easily trigger and amplify wage-
wage spirals.  Persistently high wage growth is contributing to a high 
rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services. …  
 
There is uncertainty as to developments in many of the factors that 
will influence inflation in the period ahead.  This also applies to the 
krone exchange rate.  Relationships in the foreign exchange market 
are unstable.  Our projections for inflation are based on the assump-
tion of a krone exchange rate equal to the average for the second quar-
ter.  The krone is now stronger than this.  A persistently strong krone 
will have a dampening impact on inflation compared with the projec-
tions we have presented.” 
 
Given the strong inflationary pressure referred to in the July 3 decision, it 
would probably have been reasonable to assume a new instrument rate in-
crease on the next meeting, August 7.  However, the Board chose to keep the 
rates stable, although the bias was still up.   
 
Throughout July and August, data for the Norwegian economy indicated a 
softening of domestic demand.  Seasonally adjusted goods consumption de-
celerated, industrial activity remained weak, and unemployment picked up.  
Moreover, the Prime Minister signaled that the National Budget, due on Oc-
tober 3, would imply a tight policy stance in order to prevent excessive 
stimulus to the economy.  In line with this, the term structure of interest rates 
indicates an expected fall in the instrument rate.  
 
At the Board meeting on September 18, the instrument rate was left un-
changed and bias was changed to neutral. 
 
5.5  Market anticipation of interest-rate decisions and market 
communication 
 
The so-called surprise factor, the shift in market interest rate due to interest-
rate decisions by the central bank, has been larger in Norway compared with 
other inflation targeting countries (Bernhardsen and Kloster (2002)).  Such a 
shift indicates that the market had not fully anticipated the interest-rate deci-
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sions (see figure 5.7 for the change in the one-month interest rate after 
monetary-policy meetings).  The impact on Norwegian short term interest 
rates has been somewhat stronger than a broad international average for the 
1990s.  The Bank suggests that one reason for this may be that Norway’s 
inflation target is recent, and that it takes time for market participants and 
Norges Bank to gain experience with regard to response patterns and com-
munication.  Another possible reason is that the instrument rate has been 
adjusted by a half percentage point in Norway, while other central banks 
with lower interest rates have more frequently changed key rates by a quarter 
percentage point.  Furthermore, the inflation-targeting regime is new and 
both market participants and the Bank may need more experience in order to 
increase the predictability of interest-rate decisions.   
 
Figure 5.7.  Changes in the one-month rate after monetary-policy meetings 
 
 
Increased predictability of monetary policy is desirable because it makes the 
implementation of monetary policy more effective and reduces volatility in 
the market.  Of course, this does not mean that the Bank should set the inter-
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est rate so as to fulfill market expectations.  As noted by Gjedrem (2002):  
“If a central bank always acts in line with market expectations, there would 
no longer be an objective anchor for financial market expectations.”    
 
We are confident that some of our recommended improvements would re-
duce the surprise factor and make interest-rate decisions more predictable.  
Our recommendation to announce the Bank’s best projection of its future 
instrument-rate path would contribute to this.  This will guide the market 
both with respect to timing and levels of the changes in interest rates and 
further improve the effect of monetary policy through the term structure of 
interest rates.  Publishing the Strateginotat will give further details into the 
Bank’s analysis and plans.  Finally, we note with approval the effort the 
Bank is already making in arranging regular meetings with market partici-
pants with discussions of the conduct of monetary policy.  
 
5.6  Potential improvements to the conduct of monetary policy 
 
Although we believe Norges Bank is already conducting inflation targeting 
according to best international practice, we nevertheless see a number of in-
stances where its way of conducting monetary policy could be improved.  
These instances would in several cases involve pushing the frontier of best 
international practice further out: 
 
• Inflation projections should generally be done conditional on the Bank’s 
preferred instrument-rate path; that is, conditional on its best forecast of 
its future instrument-rate settings.  This would normally be a time-
varying instrument-rate path.  The assumed exchange-rate path should 
also normally be the Bank’s best forecast of the future exchange rate, 
also normally a time-variable path.  This would avoid some problems 
and inconsistencies associated with the current standard assumption of 
constant interest and exchange rates.  It may also make monetary policy 
more predictable and improve the Bank’s communication with the mar-
ket.  
• The central projections should be the mean projections (the probability-
weighted average outcome) rather than mode projections (the most 
likely outcome).  This is in line with established economic theory, which 
says that it is the mean forecast rather than the mode forecast that is 
relevant for decisions.  This would normally make the somewhat cum-
bersome adjustment of the mode projection to the balance of risk unnec-
essary, and the fan charts for the projections would mainly be used to il-
lustrate the uncertainty of the projections. 
• The Bank should construct and publish projections of potential output, 
actual output and hence the output gap, conditional on time-variable in-
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strument-rate paths.  In this way the Bank can better reach the most de-
sirable compromise between inflation variability and output-gap vari-
ability and the resulting compromise will be more open to external scru-
tiny. 
• The emphasis on the precise two-year horizon of inflation projections on 
target should be reduced.  Instead, the Bank should find the projections 
of inflation, the output gap and the corresponding instrument-rate path 
that the Bank thinks would achieve the best compromise between infla-
tion stability and output-gap stability.  These projections should be pub-
lished in the Inflation Report and the Bank should set its instrument rate 
accordingly.  These projections will then be the Bank’s best uncondi-
tional forecast of future inflation, output gap and instrument rate.  Pub-
lishing them will maximize the impact on private-sector expectations 
and thereby implement monetary policy more effectively.  Publishing 
them also opens the Bank’s projections for more precise external scru-
tiny.  The fan charts around the projections should be constructed and in-
terpreted as the Bank’s best unconditional estimate of the uncertainty in 
the projections, thus conditional on its own future policy response. 
• The Bank’s analysis and explanations might benefit from further use of 
the concepts of potential output, output gap and neutral real interest rate. 
• The Bank could be more explicit about the weight it puts on output-gap 
stability relative to inflation stability.  
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6  The debate on monetary policy and the currency  
appreciation 
 
 
6.1  The debate on currency appreciation 
 
The krone has now appreciated significantly against most other currencies 
(see figure 5.6).  This is a matter of considerable concern in the traded-goods 
sector, because it adds to an already high cost level.  On average, Norwegian 
companies have lost some 15% of their competitive power over the last two 
years.  
 
As discussed in section 2.4, a real appreciation of the currency is what 
should be expected under a fiscal expansion.  More precisely, the new guide-
lines for fiscal policy imply a permanent future fiscal expansion.  This is 
likely to be accompanied by not only a permanent real appreciation of the 
krone but an even stronger real appreciation in the short and medium term 
and a higher neutral real interest rate.  These adjustments are equilibrium 
adjustments of the real economy to the new fiscal policy.  Thus, they are in-
dependent of monetary policy, and cannot be prevented by monetary policy.  
Monetary policy might delay the real appreciation somewhat, by focusing on 
stabilizing the nominal exchange rate instead of inflation and the output gap.  
Perhaps such monetary policy could delay the real appreciation a few quar-
ters or perhaps a year or so.  Such a monetary policy, by being in the short 
run more expansionary than current policy by Norges Bank, would in the 
present situation most likely lead to rapidly increasing inflation and an over-
heated economy.  The real appreciation induced by fiscal policy would then 
arise through an increase in the price level.  As discussed above, historically 
such policies, because of the inherent inertia in inflation once it has taken 
off, have lead to an over-appreciation and hence overvaluation of the cur-
rency, after which the boom often has turned to bust.   
 
As far as we can see, in the current situation with a zero or positive output 
gap and considerable inflationary pressure, Norges Bank is conducting infla-
tion targeting according to best international practice in its effort to trying to 
keep the two-year-ahead inflation projection on target.  This requires a rela-
tively high real interest rate, but this is not strange since the neutral real in-
terest rate is likely to be higher, because of the future fiscal expansion and 
related current growth in consumption and demand.  Arguably, a good 
measure of the tightness of monetary policy is not the short real interest rate 
(the instrument rate less actual inflation or short term inflation expectations) 
but the short real interest rate gap, the difference between the short real in-
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terest rate and the neutral interest rate.  Then, monetary policy is actually 
less tight than one might at first think.    
 
The current public debate about the real appreciation and monetary policy 
seems quite confused.  Several recent debaters do not seem to understand the 
relation between the real appreciation and fiscal policy and the limitations of 
monetary policy.  Several participants in the debate have complained about 
the strong krone and its consequences, explicitly or implicitly blaming Nor-
ges Bank’s for contributing to this by its instrument-rate increase in July, 
2002, and its focus on stabilizing inflation, without in our view a proper 
analysis of the reasons for the appreciation.  
 
As noted above in section 3, the government’s guidelines for monetary pol-
icy are also confusing and even inconsistent on this point, and the reference 
to stability of the exchange rate should be deleted from the guidelines.   
 
Arguably, the Bank’s motivation for the de facto inflation target from 1999 
may have contributed to the confusion.  There, inflation equal to that in 
Europe was motivated as a way to achieve long-run stability in the exchange 
rate.  This argument relies on long-term purchasing-power parity, that is, that 
the long-term real exchange rate is stable.  However, in an oil economy 
where oil revenues sooner or later will be phased in, long-term purchasing 
power need not hold.  Indeed, as argued in section 2.4, a permanent fiscal 
expansion may imply a permanent real appreciation of the currency.23  
                                                     
23 There is also a more technical problem with the idea that the same inflation target 
in Norway and the rest of Europe would imply a stable nominal exchange rate, even 
if the real exchange rate is stable or even constant.  Inflation targeting is distinct 
from price-level targeting in the following way.  Suppose the inflation target is ex-
ceeded one year, so inflation is higher and the price level rises more than the infla-
tion target.  In following years, under inflation targeting, this miss of the inflation 
target is not undone.  Instead, the inflation target applies from the new higher price 
level.  This will introduce a unit root in the (log) price level.  In the simple case 
when inflation deviations from the inflation target is white noise, the (log) price 
level will be a random walk with drift equal to the inflation target.  With a constant 
real exchange rate, the nominal exchange rate will be proportional to the ratio of the 
domestic price level and the foreign price level. That is, the log exchange rate will 
be equal to a constant plus the difference between the log domestic price level and 
the log foreign price level.  If both log price levels have a unit root, the log exchange 
rate will be nonstationary rather than stationary and stable.  In the special case when 
both domestic and foreign inflation deviations from the inflation targets are white 
noise and the domestic and foreign inflation targets are the same, the log exchange 
rate will be a random walk.  If instead both Norway and the rest of Europe had a 
monetary-policy regime of price-level targeting (with price-level targets rising at the 
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Is the Bank currently explaining these insights in the best way?  In its letter 
of March 2001 to the Ministry of Finance regarding the new guidelines for 
monetary policy (Norges Bank, 2001), the Bank states: 
 
“Norges Bank would assert that a gradual phasing in of petroleum 
revenues approximately in step with the expected real return of the 
Petroleum Fund will, ceteris paribus, contribute to deteriorating 
conditions for businesses exposed to international competition [the 
tradable-goods sector].” 
 
This sentence would perhaps be even clearer if it was followed by a state-
ment that the main mechanism through which the tradable-goods sector is 
shrunk is through a real appreciation of the currency, and that this is a real 
adjustment that is not due to monetary policy. 
 
The Inflation Report of June 2002 contains a box on p. 8-10 with the title 
“Why Has the Krone Exchange Rate Appreciated?”  This box states: 
 
“The Government and the Storting adopted the guideline for the use 
of petroleum revenues in March 2001.  The rule implies a gradual 
increase of the use of petroleum revenues over the central govern-
ment budget in the years ahead.  Higher demand for private and pub-
lic services means that the sheltered sector [the nontradable sector] 
will absorb a greater share of available labor resources.  In an econ-
omy with full capacity utilization this can only occur through a 
transfer of resources from the internationally exposed sector to the 
sheltered sector.  This implies a real appreciation of the krone.” 
[Our emphasis.] 
 
On the other hand, the box mentions a number of other potential factors af-
fecting the exchange rate, so this particular explanation does not get more 
weight than others.  Perhaps debaters should be somewhat excused if they do 
not grasp the significance of this explanation? 
 
Several recent speeches of Bank officials discuss the impact of the guide-
lines for fiscal policy and the phasing in of oil revenues, but arguably they 
could be even clearer on this point.  Furthermore, these speeches, in our 
view, do not sufficiently emphasize that the real appreciation of the currency 
                                                                                                                            
same inflation target), the two price levels would be trend-stationary with the same 
trend, and the log nominal exchange rate would be stationary.   
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is a real and not a monetary phenomenon, and that it is not due to monetary 
policy.  Also, the Bank does not seem to use the concept of the neutral real 
interest rate, nor even explicitly the output gap, in its explanations of mone-
tary policy, and as noted in section 5, they might add to the Bank’s analysis 
and explanation.  A graph of the output gap and the forecast of the future 
output gap appeared in the Inflation Report of December 2000, chart 3.11 
shows a graph of the output gap and even a forecast of it.  We have not seen 
any references to the output gap in later Inflation Reports.  The main mes-
sage from the Bank on the issue of currency appreciation seems to be that 
inflation targeting implies that currency movements will increase and be 
more similar to the variability experienced in other countries with inflation 
targeting.  Moreover, occasionally it has been communicated that a com-
mitment to the inflation target will over time be the best guard against ex-
change-rate fluctuations, which we consider somewhat misleading, at least 
for an oil-producing economy with increasingly expansionary fiscal policy. 
 
6.2  Potential contributions by Norges Bank to the debate on cur-
rency appreciation 
 
• The Bank should more clearly explain the limits of monetary policy in 
relation to the real adjustment of the Norwegian economy that is likely 
to take place due to the new guidelines of fiscal policy and, in particular, 
explain that monetary policy cannot be expected to prevent the associ-
ated real appreciation of the krone.  
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7  Research at Norges Bank  
 
 
The research at Norges Bank is mostly done at the Research Department of 
Norges Bank.  The Research Department was gradually built up during the 
1980s and 1990s.  It is now playing a leading role in Norwegian macroeco-
nomic research.  The department is also very strong in time-series economet-
rics and the economics of banking.  From the start the department has en-
couraged international publishing and networking.  Its reprint series goes 
back to 1988.  It demonstrates that the department has quite a decent publi-
cation record.  Below we discuss the Bank’s RIMINI model and the chal-
lenges for research at Norges Bank.  
 
7.1  The RIMINI model 
 
Since the 1980s, the development, revision and maintenance of a quarterly 
dynamic macroeconometric model of the Norwegian economy have been 
important tasks of the Research Department.  The RIMINI model (Real 
economy and Income accounts – a MINI model) has been developed over a 
number of years.  It now comprises 375 equations, 74 of which are estimated 
behavioral relationships.  The estimation periods go back to 1968.  The un-
derlying modeling strategy is ambitious, putting strong emphasis on devel-
oping econometrically well-specified dynamic equations with error-
correction mechanisms and parameter invariance both with respect to new 
observations and shifts in exogenous variables.  The model builders give 
high priority to good forecasting and simulation properties.  Each equation is 
normally modeled separately from the rest and then combined into a com-
plete system.  The model is backward-looking rather than forward-looking, 
in the sense that there are no forward variables or expectations variables in 
the model.  
 
The RIMINI model serves several purposes for the Bank.  The most impor-
tant purpose is forecasting 2-5 years ahead to make projections for the Infla-
tion Report.  It has also been used for econometric monetary-policy evalua-
tion and for analyses of financial stability and fragility.  Often, the model is 
used in conjunction with smaller models to address special issues, such as 
models for several components of CPI.  Discretionary judgmental adjust-
ments like add factors (intercept corrections) are often used to adjust the 
model forecasts.  Therefore, the projections published in the Inflation Re-
ports express an overall assessment of the results from different models with 
considerable judgment. 
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The model allows simulations with exogenous interest rates and exchange 
rates.  The standard assumptions for Norges Bank’s projections are constant 
interest rates and exchange rates, but the model can also accommodate an 
exchange rate in line with uncovered interest-rate parity.  
 
For outsiders, it is difficult or even impossible to make a detailed evaluation 
of the properties of the model, since the documentation of the entire model 
has not yet been published.  Moreover, the model is constantly being revised 
and further developed.  
 
RIMINI is an example of the approach to fitting reduced-form models that is 
sometimes called the LSE approach and is associated with the work of David 
Hendry.  This is from a methodological point of view a rather controversial 
approach to model building (see, for instance, Faust and Whiteman 
(1997a,b) and Hendry (1997)).  Furthermore, an inflation-targeting central 
bank needs to make projections conditional on alternative instrument-rate 
settings, for instance, instrument-rate paths.  Doing this in a reduced-form 
model is associated with inherent problems, especially whether the reduced-
form model is invariant to the alternative instrument-rate paths.  A largely 
empirical model is also obviously very sensitive to the problem of being es-
timated on data from a different monetary-policy regime, in Norwegian case 
from periods of exchange-rate targeting and interest-rate regulation. 
 
Norges Bank is somewhat unusual among central banks in putting such em-
phasis on this particular model-building approach.24  Other central banks 
have instead put strong emphasis on structural models, for instance, the 
FRB/US model developed at the Federal Reserve Board or the variants of 
the Quarterly Projection Model developed at Bank of Canada and further 
developed and used by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Riksbank.  
These structural models are somewhat eclectic applications of modern open-
economy macroeconomics where the equations have structural interpreta-
tions and therefore may be more invariant to policy changes.  This means 
that the models can accommodate both backward- and forward-looking vari-
ables, and hence include forward-looking expectations formations and asset 
prices.  The models can also work as a theoretical framework during policy 
discussions and thereby contribute to more coherent and disciplined argu-
ments.   
                                                     
24 The Reserve Bank of Australia also has a model inspired by this approach, see 
Beechey, Bharucha, Cagliarini, Gruen and Thompson (2002).  The RBA model is 
more compact, with only five estimated equations against RIMINI’s 74, and better 
documented.  
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The major investment into building RIMINI was made before inflation tar-
geting was introduced in Norway.  RIMINI may very well be an efficient 
empirical model for unconditional forecasting (forecasting not conditional 
on particular instrument-rate paths, for instance), but the committee has se-
vere doubts about whether RIMINI is the most appropriate model given the 
new demands for conditional projections and simulations that arise under 
inflation targeting.  We believe Bank of Norway should invest resources into 
building structural models that at least can be used parallel with RIMINI.  A 
suite of not-too-large models for different purposes may very well be most 
appropriate.  The committee is inherently skeptical towards all-purpose 
models.  They tend to grow larger and more complex over time, as the dif-
ferent purposes call for more details in different directions.  Maintaining, re-
estimating and developing complex all-purpose models are quite costly, 
commits the staff to do a high proportion of routine work, and may prevent 
other more constructive activities in a central bank’s research department.25   
 
Norges Bank using similar models as other inflation-targeting central banks 
will also make information exchange, model discussions and research coop-
eration with other such banks easier.  The fact that RIMINI is not a transpar-
ent and clear-cut structural model that could easily be compared to models 
used by other central banks may reduce the effectiveness of sharing empiri-
cal results and model experience with other central banks.  
 
7.2  Challenges for research at Norges Bank 
 
The new framework of inflation targeting will continue to provide chal-
lenges for research at Norges Bank.  Given the academic strength of the 
Bank and its research traditions, we are confident that it will be able to meet 
this challenge.   
 
                                                     
25 One potential problem with RIMINI is that the effects of interest-rate changes on 
output, employment and inflation in many cases are surprisingly small and with sur-
prisingly long lags (see for instance a box in the Inflation Report 4/2000, of Decem-
ber 2000).  There are a number of reason why this is the case, namely estimation on 
data from other policy regimes, inadequate modeling of expectations formation or 
the interplay between the interest-rate and exchange-rate channels, etc.  It may also 
be that the results of RIMINI are adequate.  We have not had the time and resources 
to look into this issue. We understand, though, that when RIMINI is used, the model 
structure is frequently adjusted ad hoc such as to permit quicker effects of interest 
rate changes on employment and output.  This is hardly a satisfactory solution.   
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We have already suggested that the dominance of RIMINI should be reduced 
and that new more structural models should be developed.  Norges Bank will 
also need more general theoretical and empirical research on issues related to 
monetary policy in general and inflation targeting in particular.  Individual 
researchers at the Bank have already demonstrated high competence in these 
areas and made important contributions to such research.  Active research in 
these areas is of considerable importance to the Bank.  The Bank must have 
its own competence and capacity for such research for several reasons:  Such 
competence and capacity is necessary in order to rightly assess the quality 
and practicality of research related to monetary policy and inflation targeting 
conducted at other central banks and academic institutions, which is a pre-
requisite for taking advantage of and applying such research to Norwegian 
problems and issues of concern for Norges Bank.  Furthermore, such compe-
tence and capacity is necessary to do research specifically directed to spe-
cific Norwegian problems and issues of concern for Norges Bank that there-
fore may not be done elsewhere.  Finally, such competence and capacity at 
the Bank will allow the Bank to contribute to the world-wide development of 
monetary policy and inflation targeting.   
 
An even stronger commitment by the Bank to maintain and improve such 
competence and capacity may be necessary for Norges Bank to maintain the 
status of a best-international-practice inflation targeter that we think it cur-
rently deserves.  Competition is stiff at the top, and the other top inflation 
targets are hard at work at new research.  The Research Department at the 
Riksbank has as a norm for productivity that each researcher shall produce 
on average 1-2 working papers per year and that almost all of these shall be 
published in international scientific journals.  It is desirable that a high pro-
portion of the working papers produced are of such quality that they are ac-
cepted for publication in international scientific journals.   
 
7.3  Potential improvements to research at Norges Bank  
 
Potential improvements to research at Norges Bank includes 
 
• Less emphasis on the Bank’s large reduced-form model RIMINI and 
more emphasis on the development of alternative structural models. 
• An even stronger commitment to research at an academic level on issues 
related to monetary policy in general and inflation targeting in particular.  
• A high proportion of the working papers should be of such quality that 
they are accepted for publication in international scientific journals. 
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8  Conclusions and list of potential improvements 
 
 
With regard to the institutional framework for monetary policy in Norway, 
we find that it has considerable weakness.  There is no legislated mandate 
for price stability.  Although Norges Bank in practice has considerable op-
erational independence, this independence is insufficiently safeguarded in 
the central-bank act.  There is no explicit accountability structure according 
to which Norges Bank can be held accountable for its policy.  With regard to 
the institutional framework, we recommend the following improvements: 
 
• A full-fledged institutional reform should be undertaken, similar to those 
that have been accomplished in the U.K. or Sweden.  The reform should 
specify a mandate for price stability, operational independence, and ac-
countability for Norges Bank.   
 
Within the existing legislative framework, there are, however, several poten-
tial improvements of the framework that we recommend: 
   
• In order to resolve the inherent inconsistency between exchange-rate 
stability and low and stable inflation for Norway, the references to ex-
change-rate stability in the monetary-policy guidelines should be de-
leted.  (More precisely, the first sentence should be deleted and the sec-
ond sentence moved to after the fifth sentence.) 
• The appointments to the Executive Board should be of experts on mone-
tary policy and related areas, for instance, macroeconomics and financial 
markets, so that members can independently contribute to the achieve-
ment of the announced objectives for monetary policy.  
• The custom to invite political parties to nominate members to the Execu-
tive Board should be discontinued, in order to avoid the risk of sectoral, 
political or special-interest representation and related risks of deadlocks 
or policy directed to special interests rather than the country as a whole. 
• Nonattributed minutes and attributed voting records from the Executive 
Board should be published, in order to strengthen the accountability and 
further improve transparency.  These minutes should note without attri-
bution to individual members which issues were discussed and what ar-
guments were presented, as well as how individual members have voted.  
• The essential material on monetary policy submitted to or formulated by 
the Executive Board, for instance, the Strateginotat (Notes on Strategy) 
outlining policy for the next four months should be published, in order to 
strengthen accountability and further improve transparency.  
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• Several additional improvements to strengthen the accountability of 
Norges Bank should be undertaken:  (1) An evaluation by the Ministry 
of Finance of how Norges Bank has conducted monetary policy and 
achieved the stated objectives for monetary policy should be included in 
the Kredittmelding (the report by the Ministry of Finance to the Stort-
ing).  (2) Regular hearings on monetary policy should be held in the 
Storting with the governor and other officials of Norges Bank, with the 
assistance of experts appointed by the Storting.  (3) An annual or bian-
nual conference on monetary policy in Norway should be held, financed 
by Norges Bank but organized independently, for instance, by an aca-
demic institution, and open to the general public and media.  At such a 
conference, papers evaluating monetary policy by the Bank could be 
presented by national and international experts followed by comments 
by Bank officials and public discussion. 
 
Overall, we believe Norges Bank is conducting monetary policy in line with 
the best international practice demonstrated by the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, the Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank.  Nevertheless, we 
would like to recommend a number of improvements to the conduct of 
monetary policy, which if undertaken would in several cases push the fron-
tier of best-international-practice inflation targeting further out: 
 
• Inflation projections should generally be done conditional on the Bank’s 
preferred instrument-rate path (Norges Bank’s instrument rate is its 
overnight deposit rate); that is, conditional on its best forecast of its fu-
ture instrument-rate settings.  This would normally be a time-varying in-
strument-rate path.  The assumed exchange-rate path should also nor-
mally be the Bank’s best forecast of the future exchange rate, also nor-
mally a time-variable path.  This would avoid some problems and incon-
sistencies associated with the current standard assumption of constant in-
terest and exchange rates.  It may also make monetary policy more pre-
dictable and improve the Bank’s communication with the market.  
• The central projections should be the mean projections (the probability-
weighted average outcome) rather than mode projections (the most 
likely outcome).  This is in line with established economic theory, which 
says that it is the mean forecast rather than the mode forecast that is 
relevant for decisions.  This would normally make the somewhat cum-
bersome adjustment of the mode projection to the balance of risk unnec-
essary, and the fan charts for the projections would mainly be used to il-
lustrate the uncertainty of the projections. 
• The Bank should construct and publish projections of potential output, 
actual output and hence the output gap, conditional on time-variable in-
strument-rate paths.  In this way the Bank can better reach the most de-
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sirable compromise between inflation variability and output-gap vari-
ability and the resulting compromise will be more open to external scru-
tiny. 
• The emphasis on the precise two-year horizon of inflation projections on 
target should be reduced.  Instead, the Bank should find the projections 
of inflation, the output gap and the corresponding instrument-rate path 
that the Bank thinks would achieve the best compromise between infla-
tion stability and output-gap stability.  These projections should be pub-
lished in the Inflation Report and the Bank should set its instrument rate 
accordingly.  These projections will then be the Bank’s best uncondi-
tional forecast of future inflation, output gap and instrument rate. Pub-
lishing them will maximize the impact on private-sector expectations 
and thereby implement monetary policy more effectively.  Publishing 
them also opens the Bank’s projections for more precise external scru-
tiny.  The fan charts around the projections should be constructed and in-
terpreted as the Bank’s best unconditional estimate of the uncertainty in 
the projections, thus conditional on its own future policy response. 
• The Bank’s analysis and explanations might benefit from further use of 
the concepts of potential output, output gap and neutral real interest rate. 
• The Bank could be more explicit about the weight it puts on output-gap 
stability relative to inflation stability.  
 
Regarding the debate about the current situation with the new guidelines for 
fiscal policy and the corresponding real appreciation of the krone, arguably 
the Bank could explain the current situation with even more clarity.  Thus, 
we recommend:  
 
• The Bank should more clearly explain the limits of monetary policy in 
relation to the real adjustment of the Norwegian economy that is likely 
to take place due to the new guidelines of fiscal policy and, in particular, 
explain that monetary policy cannot be expected to prevent the associ-
ated real appreciation of the krone.   
 
Regarding the research at Norges Bank, we recommend: 
 
• Less emphasis on the Bank’s large reduced-form model RIMINI and 
more emphasis on the development of alternative structural models. 
• An even stronger commitment to research at an academic level on issues 
related to monetary policy in general and inflation targeting in particular.  
• A high proportion of the working papers should be of such quality that 
they are accepted for publication in international scientific journals. 
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Appendix:   
Regulation on monetary policy, March 29, 2001 
 
Established by Royal Decree of 29 March 2001 pursuant to Section 2, third 
paragraph, and Section 4, second paragraph, of the Act of 24 May 1985 no 
28 on Norges Bank and the Monetary System 
I 
§ 1. 
Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s na-
tional and international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning 
exchange rate developments.  At the same time, monetary policy shall un-
derpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and 
employment. 
 
Norges Bank is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy. 
 
Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with 
the first paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable inflation.  The opera-
tional target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of 
approximately 2.5 per cent over time. 
 
In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in 
interest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances 
shall not be taken into account. 
 
§ 2. 
Norges Bank shall regularly publish the assessments that form the basis for 
the implementation of monetary policy. 
 
§ 3. 
The international value of the Norwegian krone is determined by the ex-
change rates in the foreign exchange market. 
 
§ 4. 
On behalf of the State, Norges Bank communicates the information concern-
ing the exchange rate system ensuing from its participation in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, cf. Section 25, first paragraph, of the Act on Norges 
Bank and the Monetary System. 
 
II 
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This regulation comes into force immediately.  Regulation no. 0331 of 6 
May 1994 on the exchange rate system for the Norwegian krone is repealed 
from the same date.  
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